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A Quantile-based Test of Protection for Sale Model

Author

Listed:
  • Susumu Imai
  • Hajime Katayama
  • Kala Krishna
Abstract
This paper proposes a new test of the Protection for Sale (PFS) model by Grossman and Helpman (1994). Unlike existing methods in the literature, our approach does not require any data on political organization. We use quantile and quantile IV regressions to do so using the data from Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). Surprisingly, the results do not provide any evidence favoring the PFS model. We also explain why previous work may have inadvertently found support for it.

Suggested Citation

  • Susumu Imai & Hajime Katayama & Kala Krishna, 2010. "A Quantile-based Test of Protection for Sale Model," Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series gd10-140, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    • Handle: RePEc:hst:ghsdps:gd10-140
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    File URL: http://gcoe.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/research/discussion/2008/pdf/gd10-140.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kishore Gawande & Usree Bandyopadhyay, 2000. "Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 139-152, February.
    2. Giovanni Facchini & Johannes Van Biesebroeck & Gerald Willmann, 2006. "Protection for sale with imperfect rent capturing," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 39(3), pages 845-873, August.
    3. Imai, Susumu & Katayama, Hajime & Krishna, Kala, 2013. "A quantile-based test of protection for sale model," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 40-52.
    4. Chad P. Bown & Meredith A. Crowley, 2013. "Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements: Evidence from Time-Varying Trade Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(2), pages 1071-1090, April.
    5. Bombardini, Matilde, 2008. "Firm heterogeneity and lobby participation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 329-348, July.
    6. Devashish Mitra & Dimitrios D. Thomakos & Mehmet A. Ulubaşoğlu, 2016. "“Protection For Sale” In A Developing Country: Democracy Vs. Dictatorship," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Trade Policy Theory, Evidence and Applications, chapter 9, pages 163-174, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    7. Trefler, Daniel, 1993. "Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: An Econometric Study of U.S. Import Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(1), pages 138-160, February.
    8. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31.
    9. Josh Ederington & Jenny Minier, 2008. "Reconsidering the empirical evidence on the Grossman-Helpman model of endogenous protection," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 41(2), pages 501-516, May.
    10. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    11. Imai, Susumu & Katayama, Hajime & Krishna, Kala, 2009. "Protection for sale or surge protection?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(6), pages 675-688, August.
    12. Phillip McCalman, 2004. "Protection for Sale and Trade Liberalization: an Empirical Investigation," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 81-94, February.
    13. Matschke, Xenia, 2008. "Costly revenue-raising and the case for favoring import-competing industries," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 143-157, January.
    14. Giovanni Maggi & Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December.
    15. Tovar, Patricia, 2009. "The effects of loss aversion on trade policy: Theory and evidence," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 154-167, June.
    16. Koenker, Roger W & Bassett, Gilbert, Jr, 1978. "Regression Quantiles," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(1), pages 33-50, January.
    17. Victor Chernozhukov & Christian Hansen, 2005. "An IV Model of Quantile Treatment Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(1), pages 245-261, January.
    18. Devashish Mitra, 2016. "Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Trade Policy Theory, Evidence and Applications, chapter 1, pages 3-21, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    19. Victor Chernozhukov & Christian Hansen, 2004. "The Effects of 401(K) Participation on the Wealth Distribution: An Instrumental Quantile Regression Analysis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 86(3), pages 735-751, August.
    20. Chernozhukov, Victor & Hansen, Christian, 2006. "Instrumental quantile regression inference for structural and treatment effect models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 132(2), pages 491-525, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Julien Vauday, 2008. "Heterogeneous lobbying efficiency," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne bla08053, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    2. Imai, Susumu & Katayama, Hajime & Krishna, Kala, 2013. "A quantile-based test of protection for sale model," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 40-52.
    3. Anne-Célia Disdier & Frank van Tongeren, 2010. "Non-Tariff Measures in Agri-Food Trade: What Do the Data Tell Us? Evidence from a Cluster Analysis on OECD Imports," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 32(3), pages 436-455.
    4. Jenq-Tzong Shiau & Jia-Wei Lin, 2016. "Clustering Quantile Regression-Based Drought Trends in Taiwan," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 30(3), pages 1053-1069, February.
    5. Andrey Stoyanov, 2016. "Regional Trade Agreements and Cross-border Lobbying: Empirical Evidence from the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement Negotiations," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 126-149, February.
    6. Amèvi Rocard Kouwoaye, 2021. "GATT/WTO membership–poverty nexus: An unconditional quantile regression approach," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(11), pages 3389-3421, November.
    7. Imai, Susumu & Katayama, Hajime & Krishna, Kala, 2009. "Is protection really for sale? A survey and directions for future research," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 181-191, March.
    8. Imai, Susumu & Katayama, Hajime & Krishna, Kala, 2009. "Protection for sale or surge protection?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(6), pages 675-688, August.
    9. Lorz, Oliver & Thede, Susanna, 2024. "Tariff overhang and aid: Theory and empirics," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 166(C).
    10. Andrew Jonelis & Wisarut Suwanprasert, 2022. "Protection for sale: evidence from around the world," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 237-267, April.
    11. Vincent Rebeyrol & Julien Vauday, 2008. "Live or let die : intra-sectoral lobbying on entry," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne bla08036, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    protection for sale; lobbying; political economy; quantile regression;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade

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    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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