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Corporate financing under moral hazard and the default risk of buyers

Author

Listed:
  • Peter Csoka

    (Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences)

  • Daniel Havran

    (Corvinus University of Budapest, Department of Finance)

  • Nora Szucs

    (Corvinus University of Budapest, Department of Finance)

Abstract
We extend the theoretical model of external corporate financing to the case when the buyers of the borrowing firm may default during the financing period. In our setup there is an asymmetric information and hence moral hazard between the lender and the borrower concerning the effrts of the borrower. We define the optimal debt contract in two cases. In the symmetric case the lender and the borrower has the same information about the buyer, its probability of default. In the asymmetric case the borrower learns whether the buyer will pay or not before choosing her level of efforts. We prove that in the asymmetric case the borrowing capacity and the welfare of the society is weakly smaller than in the symmetric case. We also show that the nonnegative default risk of a buyer weakly decreases borrowing capacity compared to the case when the buyer pays for sure. However, it turns out that having a risky buyer might increase borrowing capacity and welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Csoka & Daniel Havran & Nora Szucs, 2013. "Corporate financing under moral hazard and the default risk of buyers," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1322, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:has:discpr:1322
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Edina Berlinger & Anita Lovas & Péter Juhász, 2017. "State subsidy and moral hazard in corporate financing," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 25(4), pages 743-770, December.
    2. Fliszár, Vilmos, 2015. "Csökkenthető-e a referencia-kamatlábak manipulálásának valószínűsége?. Lehetséges irányok egy egyszerűsített modell alapján [Can reference interest-rate manipulation be decreased?. Possible directi," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(11), pages 1158-1171.
    3. Hong Cheng & Yingsheng Su & Jinjiang Yan & Xianyu Wang & Mingyang Li, 2019. "The Incentive Model in Supply Chain with Trade Credit and Default Risk," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2019, pages 1-11, May.
    4. Ferenc Forgó & László Kóczy & Miklós Pintér, 2015. "Editorial," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 23(4), pages 723-725, December.
    5. Berlinger, Edina & Juhász, Péter & Lovas, Anita, 2015. "Az állami támogatás hatása a projektfinanszírozásra erkölcsi kockázat és pozitív externáliák mellett. Szerződéselméleti megközelítés [The impact of state subsidy on project financing under moral ha," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 139-171.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    game theory; moral hazard; corporate financing; trade credit;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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