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Economie constitutionnelle en Afrique: analyse empirique du changement de l’article sur la limitation de mandat des présidents

Author

Listed:
  • Joseph Keneck Massil

    (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract
Cet article analyse empiriquement le changement constitutionnel en Afrique en se focalisant sur le phénomène d'actualité de modification de l'article portant sur la limitation de mandat du président de la république. L'analyse porte sur la période 1990 - 2010 et pour un ensemble de 32 pays. Deux cas sont analysés : la tentative de changement et sa réussite. Les résultats obtenus avec les modèles logit montrent que les facteurs individuels liés à la personnalité du président, la qualité du régime politique, les facteurs socioculturels et économiques sont les déterminants les plus à même d'expliquer la volonté de modification de l'article et sa réussite. L'article montre également que, dans certaines régions africaines, l'origine légale du droit constitue un frein au changement constitutionnel. Enfin, lorsque l'opposition est peu polarisée, celle-ci fait obstacle au changement, tandis qu'elle sert les intérêts du groupe politique dominant souhaitant le changement lorsqu'elle est faible et fortement fragmentée.

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph Keneck Massil, 2015. "Economie constitutionnelle en Afrique: analyse empirique du changement de l’article sur la limitation de mandat des présidents," Working Papers hal-04141384, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04141384
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04141384
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    References listed on IDEAS

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