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Estimating and Auction Platform Game with Two-Sided Entry

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  • Marleen Marra

    (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract
This paper develops and estimates a structural auction platform model with endogenous entry of buyers and sellers to study the welfare impacts of fee changes. Estimates from a new wine auction dataset illustrate the striking feature of two-sided markets that some users can be made better off despite paying higher fees. The results also underscore the importance of addressing seller selection when endogenizing (buyer) entry onto auction platforms. Quantifying the welfare effects from (anti-competitive) fee changes through a model that accounts for important user interactions enables antitrust policy to be applied to such markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Marleen Marra, 2024. "Estimating and Auction Platform Game with Two-Sided Entry," Working Papers hal-03393068, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03393068
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03393068v2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ascending auctions; Auctions with entry; Seller selection; Structural estimation of games;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • C52 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Evaluation, Validation, and Selection
    • C57 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Econometrics of Games and Auctions
    • L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce

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