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Incentives, pro-social preferences and discrimination

Author

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  • Raphaël Soubeyran

    (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier)

Abstract
In this paper, I study how a principal can provide incentives, at minimal cost, to a group of agents who have pro-social preferences in order to induce successful coordination in the presence of network externalities. I show that agents' pro-social preferences - specifically a preference for the sum of the agents' payoffs and/or for the minimum payoff - lead to a decrease in the implementation cost for the principal, a decrease in the payoff of each agent and an increase in discrimination. The model can be applied in various contexts and it delivers policy implications for designing policies that support the adoption of new technologies, for motivating a group of workers or for inducing successful coordination of NGOs.

Suggested Citation

  • Raphaël Soubeyran, 2019. "Incentives, pro-social preferences and discrimination," CEE-M Working Papers hal-02056347, CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpceem:hal-02056347
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.umontpellier.fr/hal-02056347
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Alexia Stokes & Géraldine Bocquého & Pascal Carrère & Raphaël Conde Salazar & Marc Deconchat & Léo Garcia & Antoine Gardarin & Christian Gary & Cédric Gaucherel & Mamadou Gueye & Mickael Hedde & Franç, 2023. "Services provided by multifunctional agroecosystems : Questions, obstacles and solutions," Post-Print hal-04056486, HAL.
    2. Raphaël Soubeyran, 2019. "Incentives, pro-social preferences and discrimination," Working Papers hal-02056347, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    principal; agents; pro-social preferences; incentives; externality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes

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