[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-03368986.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The content and structure of reputation domains across human societies: a view from the evolutionary social sciences

Author

Listed:
  • Zachary Garfield

    (IAST - Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse)

  • Ryan Schacht
  • Emily Post
  • Dominique Ingram
  • Andrea Uehling
  • Shane Macfarlan
Abstract
Reputations are an essential feature of human sociality and the evolution of cooperation and group living. Much scholarship has focused on reputations, yet typically on a narrow range of domains (e.g. prosociality and aggressiveness), usually in isolation. Humans can develop reputations, however, from any collective information. We conducted exploratory analyses on the content, distribution and structure of reputation domain diversity across cultures, using the Human Relations Area Files ethnographic database. After coding ethnographic texts on reputations from 153 cultures, we used hierarchical modelling, cluster analysis and text analysis to provide an empirical view of reputation domains across societies. Findings suggest: (i) reputational domains vary cross-culturally, yet reputations for cultural conformity, prosociality, social status and neural capital are widespread; (ii) reputation domains are more variable for males than females; and (iii) particular reputation domains are interrelated, demonstrating a structure consistent with dimensions of human uniqueness. We label these features: cultural group unity, dominance, neural capital, sexuality, social and material success and supernatural healing. We highlight the need for future research on the evolution of cooperation and human sociality to consider a wider range of reputation domains, as well as their social, ecological and gender-specific variability.

Suggested Citation

  • Zachary Garfield & Ryan Schacht & Emily Post & Dominique Ingram & Andrea Uehling & Shane Macfarlan, 2021. "The content and structure of reputation domains across human societies: a view from the evolutionary social sciences," Post-Print hal-03368986, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03368986
    DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0296
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03368986
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-03368986/document
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1098/rstb.2020.0296?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bates, Douglas & Mächler, Martin & Bolker, Ben & Walker, Steve, 2015. "Fitting Linear Mixed-Effects Models Using lme4," Journal of Statistical Software, Foundation for Open Access Statistics, vol. 67(i01).
    2. Herbert Gintis, 2000. "Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2000-02, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
    3. Karthik Panchanathan & Robert Boyd, 2004. "Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem," Nature, Nature, vol. 432(7016), pages 499-502, November.
    4. Robert Sugden, 2005. "Rights, Co-operation and Welfare," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare, chapter 9, pages 170-182, Palgrave Macmillan.
    5. Glowacki, Luke & Wilson, Michael L. & Wrangham, Richard W., 2020. "The evolutionary anthropology of war," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 963-982.
    6. Sergey Gavrilets & Laura Fortunato, 2014. "A solution to the collective action problem in between-group conflict with within-group inequality," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 5(1), pages 1-11, May.
    7. Martin A. Nowak & Karl Sigmund, 1998. "Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring," Nature, Nature, vol. 393(6685), pages 573-577, June.
    8. Luke Glowacki & Michael Wilson & Richard Wrangham, 2020. "The evolutionary anthropology of war," Post-Print hal-03176490, HAL.
    9. M.A. Nowak & K. Sigmund, 1998. "Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by Image Scoring/ The Dynamics of Indirect Reciprocity," Working Papers ir98040, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
    10. Hui Zou & Trevor Hastie, 2005. "Addendum: Regularization and variable selection via the elastic net," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 67(5), pages 768-768, November.
    11. Zachary Garfield & Kristen Syme & Edward H. Hagen, 2020. "Universal and variable leadership dimensions across human societies," Post-Print hal-03162384, HAL.
    12. Hui Zou & Trevor Hastie, 2005. "Regularization and variable selection via the elastic net," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 67(2), pages 301-320, April.
    13. Robert Sugden, 2005. "The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-0-230-53679-1, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Simone Righi & Károly Takács, 2022. "Gossip: Perspective Taking to Establish Cooperation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 1086-1100, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jelle De Boer, 2017. "Social Preferences and Context Sensitivity," Games, MDPI, vol. 8(4), pages 1-15, October.
    2. Wang, Chengjiang & Wang, Li & Wang, Juan & Sun, Shiwen & Xia, Chengyi, 2017. "Inferring the reputation enhances the cooperation in the public goods game on interdependent lattices," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 293(C), pages 18-29.
    3. Szefer Elena & Lu Donghuan & Nathoo Farouk & Beg Mirza Faisal & Graham Jinko, 2017. "Multivariate association between single-nucleotide polymorphisms in Alzgene linkage regions and structural changes in the brain: discovery, refinement and validation," Statistical Applications in Genetics and Molecular Biology, De Gruyter, vol. 16(5-6), pages 367-386, December.
    4. Hu, Menglong & Wang, Juan & Kong, Lingcong & An, Kang & Bi, Tao & Guo, Baohong & Dong, Enzeng, 2015. "Incorporating the information from direct and indirect neighbors into fitness evaluation enhances the cooperation in the social dilemmas," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 47-52.
    5. András Németh & Károly Takács, 2007. "The Evolution of Altruism in Spatially Structured Populations," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 10(3), pages 1-4.
    6. Brosnan, Sarah F., 2011. "An evolutionary perspective on morality," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 23-30, January.
    7. Quan, Ji & Nie, Jiacheng & Chen, Wenman & Wang, Xianjia, 2022. "Keeping or reversing social norms promote cooperation by enhancing indirect reciprocity," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    8. Yang, Guoli & Wu, Yu'e & Cavaliere, Matteo, 2024. "Information-driven cooperation on adaptive cyber-physical systems," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 466(C).
    9. Wang, Zhen & Chen, Tong & Wang, Yongjie, 2017. "Leadership by example promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods game," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 100-105.
    10. Hammerstein, Peter & Leimar, Olof, 2015. "Evolutionary Game Theory in Biology," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    11. Chang, Shuhua & Zhang, Zhipeng & Wu, Yu’e & Xie, Yunya, 2018. "Cooperation is enhanced by inhomogeneous inertia in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 490(C), pages 419-425.
    12. Kurokawa, Shun, 2019. "How memory cost, switching cost, and payoff non-linearity affect the evolution of persistence," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 341(C), pages 174-192.
    13. Chen, Qiao & Chen, Tong & Wang, Yongjie, 2019. "Cleverly handling the donation information can promote cooperation in public goods game," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 346(C), pages 363-373.
    14. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2004. "Social norms and human cooperation," Macroeconomics 0409026, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Wolff, Irenaeus, 2009. "Counterpunishment revisited: an evolutionary approach," MPRA Paper 16923, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Wang, Zhen & Wu, Bin & Li, Ya-peng & Gao, Hang-xian & Li, Ming-chu, 2013. "Does coveting the performance of neighbors of thy neighbor enhance spatial reciprocity?," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 28-34.
    17. Haruto Takagishi & Michiko Koizumi & Takayuki Fujii & Joanna Schug & Shinya Kameshima & Toshio Yamagishi, 2014. "The Role of Cognitive and Emotional Perspective Taking in Economic Decision Making in the Ultimatum Game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 9(9), pages 1-7, September.
    18. Misato Inaba & Nobuyuki Takahashi, 2019. "Linkage Based on the Kandori Norm Successfully Sustains Cooperation in Social Dilemmas," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(1), pages 1-15, February.
    19. Cristina Acedo-Carmona & Antoni Gomila, 2014. "Personal Trust Increases Cooperation beyond General Trust," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 9(8), pages 1-10, August.
    20. Ding, Rui & Wang, Xianjia & Liu, Yang & Zhao, Jinhua & Gu, Cuiling, 2023. "Evolutionary games with environmental feedbacks under an external incentive mechanism," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03368986. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.