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Trade and bank credit in a non-cooperative chain with a price-sensitive demand

Author

Listed:
  • Vincent Hovelaque

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Jean-Laurent Viviani

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Mohamed Ait Mansour

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract
The purpose of this article is to examine the impact of the working capital in the borrowing decision of a retailer. The proposed analysis is based on a model with a retailer, a supplier and a bank in a non-cooperative game with price-sensitive demand. The retailer, the supplier and the bank (if concerned) determine, respectively, the ordering quantity, the wholesale price and the interest rate. A Stackelberg game-theoretic approach is employed where the retailer is a follower and either the supplier or the bank is the leader. Some structural properties are first derived from the mathematical models. Then, some numerical simulations show that: (i) a trade credit guarantees the same profits for the retailer and the supplier as in the case where the retailer has sufficient cash holdings, (ii) there exist some situations where the retailer has a better profit with a borrow than with sufficient cash holdings, and (iii) borrowing decision depends on both retailer's and supplier's discount rate and the retailer's cash holdings.

Suggested Citation

  • Vincent Hovelaque & Jean-Laurent Viviani & Mohamed Ait Mansour, 2022. "Trade and bank credit in a non-cooperative chain with a price-sensitive demand," Post-Print hal-03127787, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03127787
    DOI: 10.1080/00207543.2020.1866222
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03127787
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    Cited by:

    1. Kuan Zeng & Xianhao Xu & Pin Zhou & Qingguo Bai, 2024. "Financing the newsvendor with vendor credit line," Operations Management Research, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 833-849, September.
    2. Yang, Yang & Liu, Jie, 2023. "Price timing and financing strategies for a capital-constrained supply chain with price-dependent stochastic demand," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 261(C).
    3. Irfanullah Khan & Biswajit Sarkar, 2021. "Transfer of Risk in Supply Chain Management with Joint Pricing and Inventory Decision Considering Shortages," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(6), pages 1-20, March.
    4. Jiang, Wen-Hui & Xu, Ling & Chen, Zhen-Song & Govindan, Kannan & Chin, Kwai-Sang, 2022. "Financing equilibrium in a capital constrained supply Chain: The impact of credit rating," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    5. Tang, Ruihong & Yang, Lei & Ji, Jingna, 2023. "Impacts of fairness concerns on financing equilibrium in a low-carbon supply chain," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 180(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Trade credit; bank credit; Bank credit; Game theory; Supply chain finance; Inventory;
    All these keywords.

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