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Three consequences of considering innovation as a collective process and knowledge as a collective good

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  • Julien Pénin

    (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract
Following the seminal work of Arrow (1962) and Nelson (1959) innovation is traditionally viewed as an individual process involving isolated agents connected only through market interactions and the outcome of this process, knowledge, is assumed to share the properties of a public good. Once produced, knowledge is supposed to spill over, i.e., to benefit other agents in the economy instantly. Departing from this approach we adopt here the view that innovation is a collective and interactive process and that knowledge is a collective good, in the sense that it flows only within networks or clubs. This shift of vision helps to improve our understanding of several points dealing with the innovation process. In this paper, we explore three of these points: the absorption of external knowledge, firms' strategies of knowledge management (secrecy versus disclosure) and innovation public policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Julien Pénin, 2005. "Three consequences of considering innovation as a collective process and knowledge as a collective good," Post-Print hal-00278703, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00278703
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219649205001006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kenneth Arrow, 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," NBER Chapters, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    5. Michael S. Dahl & Christian Ø.R. Pedersen, 2003. "Knowledge Flows through Informal Contacts in Industrial Clusters Myths or Realities?," DRUID Working Papers 03-01, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
    6. Stefano Breschi & Francesco Lissoni, 2003. "Mobility and Social Networks: Localised Knowledge Spillovers Revisited," KITeS Working Papers 142, KITeS, Centre for Knowledge, Internationalization and Technology Studies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy, revised Mar 2003.
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