[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/cesptp/halshs-01022728.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Policy experimentation, political competition and heterogeneous beliefs

Author

Listed:
  • Antony Millner

    (LSE - London School of Economics and Political Science)

  • Hélène Ollivier

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Leo Simon

    (LBNL - Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory [Berkeley])

Abstract
We consider a two period model in which an incumbent political party chooses the level of a current policy variable unilaterally, but faces competition from a political opponent in the future. Both parties care about voters' payoffs, but they have different beliefs about how policy choices will map into future economic outcomes. We show that when the incumbent party can endogenously influence whether learning occurs through its policy choices (policy experimentation), future political competition gives it a new incentive to distort its policies – it manipulates them so as to reduce uncertainty and disagreement in the future, thus avoiding the costs of competitive elections with an opponent very different from itself. The model thus demonstrates that all incumbents can find it optimal to ‘over experiment', relative to a counterfactual in which they are sure to be in power in both periods. We thus identify an incentive for strategic policy manipulation that does not depend on self-serving behavior by political parties, but rather stems from their differing beliefs about the consequences of their actions.

Suggested Citation

  • Antony Millner & Hélène Ollivier & Leo Simon, 2014. "Policy experimentation, political competition and heterogeneous beliefs," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01022728, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01022728
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01022728
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01022728/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2008. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation, and Debt," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 201-236, March.
    2. Bohn, Frank, 2007. "Polarisation, uncertainty and public investment failure," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 1077-1087, December.
    3. Bertocchi, Graziella & Spagat, Michael, 1993. "Learning, experimentation, and monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 169-183, August.
    4. Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A., 2001. "Inefficient Redistribution," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 95(3), pages 649-661, September.
    5. Winslott-Hiselius, Lena & Brundell-Freij, Karin & Vagland, Asa & Byström, Camilla, 2009. "The development of public attitudes towards the Stockholm congestion trial," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 269-282, March.
    6. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "The size and scope of government:: Comparative politics with rational politicians," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 699-735, April.
    7. Wittman, Donald A., 1973. "Parties as Utility Maximizers," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(2), pages 490-498, June.
    8. Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria & Spolaore, Enrico, 1994. "How cynical can an incumbent be? Strategic policy in a model of government spending," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 121-140, September.
    9. Thomas Piketty, 1995. "Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(3), pages 551-584.
    10. Eric Van den Steen, 2004. "Rational Overoptimism (and Other Biases)," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1141-1151, September.
    11. Bruno Strulovici, 2010. "Learning While Voting: Determinants of Collective Experimentation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(3), pages 933-971, May.
    12. Tabellini, Guido & Alesina, Alberto, 1990. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 37-49, March.
    13. Wittman, Donald, 1983. "Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 142-157, March.
    14. Nicola Persico & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2001. "The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 225-239, March.
    15. Torsten Persson & Lars E. O. Svensson, 1989. "Why a Stubborn Conservative would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(2), pages 325-345.
    16. Ulph, Alistair & Ulph, David, 1997. "Global Warming, Irreversibility and Learning," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(442), pages 636-650, May.
    17. Epstein, Larry G, 1980. "Decision Making and the Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(2), pages 269-283, June.
    18. Kelly, David L. & Kolstad, Charles D. & Mitchell, Glenn T., 2005. "Adjustment costs from environmental change," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 468-495, November.
    19. Godfrey Keller & Sven Rady, 1999. "Optimal Experimentation in a Changing Environment," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(3), pages 475-507.
    20. Morris, Stephen, 1995. "The Common Prior Assumption in Economic Theory," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 227-253, October.
    21. Marina Azzimonti, 2011. "Barriers to Investment in Polarized Societies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(5), pages 2182-2204, August.
    22. Kenneth J. Arrow & Anthony C. Fisher, 1974. "Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty, and Irreversibility," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 88(2), pages 312-319.
    23. Gollier, Christian & Jullien, Bruno & Treich, Nicolas, 2000. "Scientific progress and irreversibility: an economic interpretation of the 'Precautionary Principle'," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 229-253, February.
    24. Adams Scott & Cotti Chad D., 2007. "The Effect of Smoking Bans on Bars and Restaurants: An Analysis of Changes in Employment," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-34, February.
    25. Sanford J. Grossman & Richard E. Kihlstrom & Leonard J. Mirman, 1977. "A Bayesian Approach to the Production of Information and Learning By Doing," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 44(3), pages 533-547.
    26. Jonathan Leape, 2006. "The London Congestion Charge," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 157-176, Fall.
    27. Friedman, Milton, 1966. "Essays in Positive Economics," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226264035, April.
    28. Roland G. Fryer, Jr. & Philipp Harms & Matthew O. Jackson, 2013. "Updating Beliefs with Ambiguous Evidence: Implications for Polarization," NBER Working Papers 19114, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    29. Alistair Ulph & David Ulph, "undated". "Global Warming, Irreversibility And Learning," ELSE working papers 056, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
    30. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1998. "Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 139-156, March.
    31. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    32. Edward L. Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, 2013. "Why Does Balanced News Produce Unbalanced Views?," NBER Working Papers 18975, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    33. Henry, Claude, 1974. "Investment Decisions Under Uncertainty: The "Irreversibility Effect."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(6), pages 1006-1012, December.
    34. Aidt, Toke S. & Dutta, Jayasri, 2007. "Policy myopia and economic growth," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 734-753, September.
    35. Kelly, David L. & Kolstad, Charles D., 1999. "Bayesian learning, growth, and pollution," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 491-518, February.
    36. Prescott, Edward C, 1972. "The Multi-Period Control Problem Under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(6), pages 1043-1058, November.
    37. Eric Van den Steen, 2010. "Disagreement and the Allocation of Control," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 26(2), pages 385-426.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bowen, Renee & Hwang, Ilwoo & Krasa, Stefan, 2022. "Personal power dynamics in bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    2. Dumas, Marion & Rising, James & Urpelainen, Johannes, 2016. "Political competition and renewable energy transitions over long time horizons: A dynamic approach," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 175-184.
    3. Tatiana Kiseleva, 2016. "Heterogeneous Beliefs and Climate Catastrophes," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(3), pages 599-622, November.
    4. Robert Dur & Arjan Non & Paul Prottung & Benedetta Ricci, 2023. "Who’s Afraid of Policy Experiments?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 23-027/V, Tinbergen Institute.
    5. Antony Millner & Hélène Ollivier, 2016. "Beliefs, Politics, and Environmental Policy," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 10(2), pages 226-244.
    6. Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2016. "Political disagreement and information in elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 390-412.
    7. Bowen, T. Renee & Krasa, Stefan & Hwang, Ilwoo, 2020. "Agenda-Setter Power Dynamics: Learning in Multi-Issue Bargaining," CEPR Discussion Papers 15406, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Xie, Yinxi & Xie, Yang, 2017. "Machiavellian experimentation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 685-711.
    9. Binswanger, Johannes & Oechslin, Manuel, 2020. "Better statistics, better economic policies?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. van Wijnbergen, Sweder & Willems, Tim, 2015. "Optimal learning on climate change: Why climate skeptics should reduce emissions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 17-33.
    2. Antony Millner & H�l�ne Ollivier & Leo Simon, 2013. "Political competition, learning and the consequences of heterogeneous beliefs for long-run public projects," GRI Working Papers 104, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
    3. Hochman, Gal & Zilberman, David, 2021. "Optimal environmental taxation in response to an environmentally-unfriendly political challenger," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    4. Ingham, Alan & Ma, Jie & Ulph, Alistair, 2007. "Climate change, mitigation and adaptation with uncertainty and learning," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(11), pages 5354-5369, November.
    5. Richard S. J. Tol & In Chang Hwang & Frédéric Reynès, 2012. "The Effect of Learning on Climate Policy under Fat-tailed Uncertainty," Working Paper Series 5312, Department of Economics, University of Sussex Business School.
    6. Laurent Gilotte & Michel de Lara, 2005. "Precautionary Effect and Variations of the Value of Information," Working Papers 2005.28, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    7. Maria Antonieta Cunha-e-Sa & Vasco Santos, 2007. "Experimentation with accumulation," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp503, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.
    8. In Chang Hwang, 2016. "Active learning and optimal climate policy," EcoMod2016 9611, EcoMod.
    9. Meglena Jeleva & Stéphane Rossignol, 2019. "Optimists, Pessimists, and the Precautionary Principle," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 74(1), pages 367-396, September.
    10. May Elsayyad & Florian Morath, 2016. "Technology Transfers For Climate Change," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(3), pages 1057-1084, August.
    11. Leach, Andrew J., 2007. "The climate change learning curve," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1728-1752, May.
    12. Cunha-e-Sa, Maria A. & Santos, Vasco, 2008. "Experimentation with accumulation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 470-496, February.
    13. Gollier, Christian & Jullien, Bruno & Treich, Nicolas, 2000. "Scientific progress and irreversibility: an economic interpretation of the 'Precautionary Principle'," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 229-253, February.
    14. Narain, Urvashi & Hanemann, W. Michael & Fisher, Anthony C., 2004. "The Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and the Irreversibility Effect," CUDARE Working Papers 25101, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    15. Courbage, Christophe & Rey, Béatrice & Treich, Nicolas, 2013. "Prevention and precaution," IDEI Working Papers 805, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    16. Narain, Urvashi & Hanemann, W. Michael & Fisher, Anthony C, 2007. "The irreversibility effect in environmental decisionmaking," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt7bc5t8cf, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    17. van den Bergh, Jeroen C.J.M., 2008. "Optimal diversity: Increasing returns versus recombinant innovation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(3-4), pages 565-580, December.
    18. Charles Kolstad & Alistair Ulph, 2011. "Uncertainty, Learning and Heterogeneity in International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 50(3), pages 389-403, November.
    19. In Chang Hwang & Richard S. J. Tol & Marjan W. Hofkes, 2019. "Active Learning and Optimal Climate Policy," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 73(4), pages 1237-1264, August.
    20. Karp, Larry & Zhang, Jiangfeng, 2006. "Regulation with anticipated learning about environmental damages," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 259-279, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    beliefs; learning; political economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01022728. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.