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Private Sector Versus Public Sector Externalities

Author

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  • Myers, G.M.
  • Mansoorian, A.
Abstract
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Suggested Citation

  • Myers, G.M. & Mansoorian, A., 1995. "Private Sector Versus Public Sector Externalities," Papers 95-1, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:yorkca:95-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wildasin, David E., 1980. "Locational efficiency in a federal system," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 453-471, November.
    2. Wildasin, David E., 1989. "Interjurisdictional capital mobility: Fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 193-212, March.
    3. Robin W. Boadway & Frank R. Flatters, 1982. "Efficiency and Equalization Payments in a Federal System of Government: A Synthesis and Extension of Recent Results," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 15(4), pages 613-633, November.
    4. Mansoorian, Arman & Myers, Gordon M., 1993. "Attachment to home and efficient purchases of population in a fiscal externality economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 117-132, August.
    5. Hercowitz, Zvi & Pines, David, 1991. "Migration with fiscal externalities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 163-180, November.
    6. Dietmar Wellisch, 1995. "Can household mobility solve basic environmental problems?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 2(2), pages 245-260, August.
    7. Wellisch, Dietmar, 1994. "Interregional spillovers in the presence of perfect and imperfect household mobility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 167-184, October.
    8. Alan Williams, 1966. "The Optimal Provision of Public Goods in a System of Local Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 74(1), pages 18-33.
    9. Flatters, Frank & Henderson, Vernon & Mieszkowski, Peter, 1974. "Public goods, efficiency, and regional fiscal equalization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 99-112, May.
    10. Wildasin, David E, 1991. "Income Redistribution in a Common Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 757-774, September.
    11. Boadway, Robin, 1982. "On the Method of Taxation and the Provision of Local Public Goods: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(4), pages 846-851, September.
    12. Burbidge, John B. & Myers, Gordon M., 1994. "Population mobility and capital tax competition," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 441-459, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Vincent Hildebrand & Charles Plourde, 2001. "A Model of Competing Jurisdictions with Locally Polluting Environments and Mobile Populations," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 18(2), pages 219-231, February.

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    Keywords

    PRIVATE SECTOR; PUBLIC SECTOR;

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