Double Implementation of the Lindahl Equilibrium by a Continuous Mechanism
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- Bezalel Peleg, 1996. "Double implementation of the Lindahl equilibrium by a continuous mechanism," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 311-324, December.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Tian, Guoqiang, 2009. "Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 113-123, January.
- Charles Figuières & Marc Willinger, 2012. "Regulating ambient pollution when social costs are unknown," Working Papers 12-17, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Jun 2012.
- Van Essen, Matthew & Walker, Mark, 2017. "A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 6-19.
- Tian, Guoqiang, 2000. "Incentive Mechanism Design for Production Economies with Both Private and Public Ownerships," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 294-320, November.
- Hassan Benchekroun & Charles Figuières & Mabel Tidball, 2016.
"Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondance via Simple Indirect Mechanisms,"
Working Papers
halshs-01378460, HAL.
- Hassan Benchekroun & Charles Figuières & Mabel Tidball, 2016. "Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondance via Simple Indirect Mechanisms," AMSE Working Papers 1637, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
- Sertel, Murat R. & Sanver, M. Remzi, 1999. "Equilibrium outcomes of Lindahl-endowment pretension games1," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 149-162, June.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2001.
"A crash course in implementation theory,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
- Jackson, Matthew O., 1999. "A Crash Course in Implementation Theory," Working Papers 1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Kimya, Mert, 2017. "Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 138-146.
- Luis Corchon & Simon Wilkie, 1996. "Double implementation of the ratio correspondence by a market mechanism," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 325-337, December.
- repec:cte:werepe:we081207 is not listed on IDEAS
- Tian, Guoqiang, 2003. "A solution to the problem of consumption externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 831-847, November.
- Tian, Guoqiang, 2000. "Double implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 175-189, September.
- Suh, Sang-Chul, 2001. "An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 103-110, January.
- Tian, Guoqiang, 2000. "Implementation of balanced linear cost share equilibrium solution in Nash and strong Nash equilibria," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 239-261, May.
- Francisco Candel-Sánchez, 2012. "Pigouvian taxes and the Varian’s mechanism in dynamic settings," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 39-51, August.
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More about this item
Keywords
MATHEMATICS; PUBLIC GOODS; GAMES;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C00 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - General
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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