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Why to Invest in your Neighbor? Social Contract on Educational Investment

Author

Listed:
  • Poutvaara, P.
  • Kanniainen, V.
Abstract
It may be in the interest of low-ability individuals to subsidize the education of high-ability individuals. Sufficient conditions are surprisingly mild: positive externalities in education and complementarity in production between human capital and labor supplied by the low-ability individuals. However, tax competition and the free mobility of the educated give rise to time-inconsistency and free-riding problems which render such a social contract infeasible and result in a suboptimally low investment in education.

Suggested Citation

  • Poutvaara, P. & Kanniainen, V., 1999. "Why to Invest in your Neighbor? Social Contract on Educational Investment," University of Helsinki, Department of Economics 462, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:helsec:462
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    EDUCATION ; CONTRACTS ; SOCIETY ; TAXATION;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity

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