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Key players in bullying networks

Author

Listed:
  • Ata Atay

    (Universitat de Barcelona and BEAT)

  • Ana Mauleon

    (CEREC, UCLouvain Saint-Louis Brussels and CORE/LIDAM, UCLouvain, Belgium)

  • Simon Schopohl

    (CEREC, UCLouvain Saint-Louis Brussels, Belgium)

  • Vincent Vannetelbosch

    (CORE/LIDAM, UCLouvain, Belgium)

Abstract
Individuals are embedded in a network of relationships and they can be victims, bystanders, or perpetrators of bullying and harassment. Each individual decides noncooperatively how much effort to exert in preventing misbehavior. Each individual's optimal effort depends on the contextual effect, the social multiplier effect and the social conformity effect. We characterize the Nash equilibrium and we derive an inter-centrality measure for finding the key player who once isolated increases the most the aggregate effort. An individual is more likely to be the key player if she is influencing many other individuals, she is exerting a low effort because of her characteristics, and her neighbors are strongly influenced by her. The key player policy increases substantially the aggregate effort and the targeted player should never be selected randomly. The key player is likely to remain the key player in presence of social workers except if she is becoming much less influential due to her closeness to social workers. Finally, we consider alternative policies (e.g. training bystanders for helping victims) and compare them to the policy of isolating the key player.

Suggested Citation

  • Ata Atay & Ana Mauleon & Simon Schopohl & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2022. "Key players in bullying networks," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2022/422, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ewp:wpaper:422web
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/186353
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Coralio Ballester & Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Yves Zenou, 2006. "Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(5), pages 1403-1417, September.
    2. Boucher, Vincent, 2016. "Conformism and self-selection in social networks," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 30-44.
    3. Lindquist, Matthew J. & Zenou, Yves, 2019. "Crime and Networks: 10 Policy Lessons," IZA Discussion Papers 12534, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Landini, Fabio & Montinari, Natalia & Pin, Paolo & Piovesan, Marco, 2016. "Friendship network in the classroom: Parents bias on peer effects," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 56-73.
    5. Eleonora Patacchini & Yves Zenou, 2012. "Juvenile Delinquency and Conformism," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(1), pages 1-31.
    6. Jackson, Matthew O. & Zenou, Yves, 2015. "Games on Networks," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    7. Lung-Fei Lee & Xiaodong Liu & Eleonora Patacchini & Yves Zenou, 2021. "Who is the Key Player? A Network Analysis of Juvenile Delinquency," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(3), pages 849-857, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mauleon, Ana & Nanumyan, Mariam & Schopohl, Simon & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2023. "Unions and key players in network games with conflicts and spillovers," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2023012, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social networks; bullying; harassment; peer effects; key player; conformity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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