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The Designated Hitter Rule and Team Defensive Strategy in Japan's Professional Baseball Leagues

Author

Listed:
  • Akihiko Kawaura

    (Graduate School of Policy and Management, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan)

  • Sumner J. La Croix

    (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii and Economic Study Area, East-West Center)

Abstract
Economists have debated whether and why the designated hitter (DH) rule in North American major league baseball led to an increase in hit-batsmen. We use data from Japan's professional baseball leagues, the Pacific League (DH rule) and the Central League (no DH rule), to re-examine this question. Our empirical findings reveal increases in hit-batsmen in the Pacific League after we control for the DH's effect on team batting performance. We argue that the DH rule induced changes in managerial defensive strategies that led to more hit-batsmen. Subsequent rule changes reduced the effectiveness of these strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Akihiko Kawaura & Sumner J. La Croix, 2005. "The Designated Hitter Rule and Team Defensive Strategy in Japan's Professional Baseball Leagues," Economics Study Area Working Papers 80, East-West Center, Economics Study Area.
    • Handle: RePEc:ewc:wpaper:wp80
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Trandel, Gregory A & White, Lawrence H & Klein, Peter G, 1998. "The Effect of the Designated Hitter Rule on Hit Batsmen: Pitcher's Moral Hazard or the Team's Cost-Benefit Calculation? A Comment," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(4), pages 679-684, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Akihiko Kawaura & Sumner La Croix, 2010. "The Designated Hitter Rule in Baseball as a Natural Experiment," Working Papers 201005, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    2. Akihiko Kawaura, 2010. "Designated Hitter Rule Debate: A Search for Mr. Hyde in Pitchers," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 11(3), pages 349-357, June.
    3. Kevin Baldini & Mark T. Gillis & Matt E. Ryan, 2011. "Do Relief Pitching and Remaining Games Create Moral Hazard Problems in Major League Baseball?," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 12(6), pages 647-659, December.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • J28 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy

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