Shadow Economy, Rent-Seeking Activities and the Perils of Reinforcement of the Rule of Law
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- Ekaterina Vostroknutova, 2003. "Shadow Economy, Rent-Seeking Activities and the Perils of Reinforcement of the Rule of Law," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2003-578, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
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Cited by:
- Clara Delavallade, 2007.
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Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
v07002, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Clara Delavallade, 2007. "Why do North African firms involve in corruption?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00143412, HAL.
- Clara Delavallade, 2007. "Why do North African firms involve in corruption?," Post-Print halshs-00143412, HAL.
- Clara Delavallade, 2012.
"What Drives Corruption? Evidence from North African Firms,"
Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 21(4), pages 499-547, August.
- Clara Delavallade, 2011. "What Drives Corruption? Evidence from North African Firms," Working Papers 244, Economic Research Southern Africa.
- Clara Delavallade, 2011. "What Drives Corruption? Evidence from North African Firms," SALDRU Working Papers 68, Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town.
- Maxim Bouev, 2005. "State Regulations, Job Search and Wage Bargaining: A Study in the Economics of the Informal Sector," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp764, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Ramon Casadesus-Masanell & Tarun Khanna, 2003. "Globalization and Trust: Theory and Evidence from Cooperatives," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp592, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
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More about this item
Keywords
corruption; rent-seeking; shadow economy; law enforcement; transition;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ENT-2003-07-13 (Entrepreneurship)
- NEP-LAW-2003-07-13 (Law and Economics)
- NEP-TRA-2003-07-13 (Transition Economics)
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