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NOW OR LATER? - An Analysis of the Timing of Threats in Bargaining

Author

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  • Siegfried K. Berninghaus
  • Werner Güth
Abstract
The variable threat-bargaining model of Nash (1953) assumes that threats in the sense of binding commitments as to what one will do if bargaining ends in conflict, are chosen before bargaining. By comparision, late threats to be chosen after bargaining end in conflict, appear more natural and would be self-enforcing, i.e., require no commitment power. Instead of exogenously imposing the timing of threats, they are derived endogenously as in indirect evolution or endogenous timing. Based on a duopoly market, we first derive the equilibrium for all possible constellations regarding the timing of threats. From these results we can show that the evolutionary analysis surprisingly justifies the early timing of threats as suggested by Nash (1953).

Suggested Citation

  • Siegfried K. Berninghaus & Werner Güth, 2002. "NOW OR LATER? - An Analysis of the Timing of Threats in Bargaining," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-38, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  • Handle: RePEc:esi:discus:2002-38
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    File URL: ftp://papers.econ.mpg.de/esi/discussionpapers/2002-38.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Slutsky, Steven M., 1990. "Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 29-46, March.
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    6. Siegfried Berninghaus & Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, 2003. "From teleology to evolution," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 385-410, October.
    7. van Damme, Eric & Hurkens, Sjaak, 1997. "Games with Imperfectly Observable Commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 282-308, October.
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    9. Sadanand, Asha & Sadanand, Venkatraman, 1996. "Firm Scale and the Endogenous Timing of Entry: a Choice between Commitment and Flexibility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 516-530, August.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperative Bargaining; Thread Points in Bargaining; Timing of Decisions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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