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Asset encumbrance, bank funding and fragility

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  • Ahnert, Toni
  • Anand, Kartik
  • Gai, Prasanna
  • Chapman, James
Abstract
We model asset encumbrance by banks subject to rollover risk and study the consequences for fragility, funding costs, and prudential regulation. A bank's privately optimal encumbrance choice balances the benefit of expanding profitable yet illiquid investment, funded by cheap long-term senior secured debt, against the cost of greater fragility from runs on unsecured debt. We derive testable implications about encumbrance ratios. The introduction of deposit insurance or wholesale funding guarantees induces excessive encumbrance and fragility. Ex-ante limits on asset encumbrance or ex-post Pigovian taxes eliminate such risk-shifting incentives. Our results shed light on prudential policies currently pursued in several jurisdictions.

Suggested Citation

  • Ahnert, Toni & Anand, Kartik & Gai, Prasanna & Chapman, James, 2018. "Asset encumbrance, bank funding and fragility," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118919, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:118919
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/118919/
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    Cited by:

    1. Benito, Enrique & Banal-Estanol, Albert & Khametshin, Dmitry, 2017. "Asset encumbrance and bank risk: First evidence from public disclosures in Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 12168, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Garcia-Appendini, Emilia & Gatti, Stefano & Nocera, Giacomo, 2023. "Does asset encumbrance affect bank risk? Evidence from covered bonds," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    3. Enrico Perotti & Rafael Matta, 2015. "Insecure Debt," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-035/IV/DSF88, Tinbergen Institute.
    4. Ahnert, Toni & Hoffmann, Peter & Leonello, Agnese & Porcellacchia, Davide, 2023. "Central Bank Digital Currency and financial stability," Working Paper Series 2783, European Central Bank.
    5. Toni Ahnert & Kartik Anand & Philipp Johann König, 2024. "Real Interest Rates, Bank Borrowing, and Fragility," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 56(6), pages 1545-1571, September.
    6. Ahnert, Toni & Elamin, Mahmoud, 2020. "Bank runs, portfolio choice, and liquidity provision," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).
    7. Toni Ahnert & David Martinez-Miera, 2021. "Bank Runs, Bank Competition and Opacity," Staff Working Papers 21-30, Bank of Canada.
    8. Zhao Li & Kebin Ma, 2022. "Contagious Bank Runs and Committed Liquidity Support," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(12), pages 9152-9174, December.
    9. Alkis Georgiadis-Harris & Maxi Guennewig, 2023. "Bank Resolution, Deposit Insurance, and Fragility," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_477, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    10. Cipollini, Fabrizio & Ielasi, Federica & Querci, Francesca, 2024. "Asset encumbrance in banks: Is systemic risk affected?," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(PA).
    11. Jonas Meuli & Thomas Nellen & Thomas Nitschka, 2021. "Covered bonds, loan growth and bank funding: The Swiss experience since 1932," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 77-94, April.
    12. George Kladakis & Lei Chen & Sotirios K. Bellos, 2022. "Wholesale funding and liquidity creation," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 59(4), pages 1501-1524, November.
    13. Leonello, Agnese & Mendicino, Caterina & Panetti, Ettore & Porcellacchia, Davide, 2022. "Savings, efficiency and bank runs," Working Paper Series 2636, European Central Bank.
    14. Bhanot, Karan & Larsson, Carl F., 2018. "Uncovering the impact of regulatory uncertainty on credit spreads: A study of the U.S. covered bond experience," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 84-110.
    15. Jens Dick-Nielsen & Jacob Gyntelberg, 2019. "Highly Liquid Mortgage Bonds Using the Match Funding Principle," Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(01), pages 1-37, December.
    16. Jose Fique, 2017. "The MacroFinancial Risk Assessment Framework (MFRAF), Version 2.0," Technical Reports 111, Bank of Canada.
    17. Robert McKeown, 2017. "An Overview Of The Canadian Banking System: 1996 To 2015," Working Paper 1379, Economics Department, Queen's University.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    asset encumbrance; bank runs; wholesale funding; secured debt; unsecured debt; encumbrance limits; encumbrance surcharges;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G00 - Financial Economics - - General - - - General
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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