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Objective and subjective compliance: a norm-based explanation of 'moral wiggle room'

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  • Spiekermann, Kai
  • Weiss, Arne
Abstract
We propose a cognitive-dissonance model of norm compliance to identify conditions for selfishly biased information acquisition. The model distinguishes between: (i) objective norm compliers, for whom the right action is a function of the state of the world; (ii) subjective norm compliers, for whom it is a function of their belief. The former seek as much information as possible; the latter acquire only information that lowers, in expected terms, normative demands. The source of 'moral wiggle room' is not belief manipulation, but the coarseness of normative prescriptions under conditions of uncertainty. In a novel experimental setup, we find evidence for such strategic information uptake. Our results suggest that attempts to change behavior by subjecting individuals to norms can lead to biased information acquisition instead of compliance.

Suggested Citation

  • Spiekermann, Kai & Weiss, Arne, 2016. "Objective and subjective compliance: a norm-based explanation of 'moral wiggle room'," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 64643, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:64643
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/64643/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Grossman, Zachary & van der Weele, Joël, 2013. "Self-Image and Strategic Ignorance in Moral Dilemmas," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt0bp6z29t, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lind, Jo Thori & Nyborg, Karine & Pauls, Anna, 2019. "Save the planet or close your eyes? Testing strategic ignorance in a charity context," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 9-19.
    2. Momsen, Katharina & Ohndorf, Markus, 2020. "Information Avoidance, Selective Exposure, and Fake(?) News - A Market Experiment," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224637, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Tobias Regner & Astrid Matthey, 2017. "Actions and the self: I give, therefore I am?," Jena Economics Research Papers 2017-018, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    4. Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D., 2020. "The development of social strategic ignorance and other regarding behavior from childhood to adulthood," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    5. Cristina Bicchieri & Eugen Dimant, 2022. "Nudging with care: the risks and benefits of social information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(3), pages 443-464, June.
    6. Bicchieri, Cristina & Dimant, Eugen & Xiao, Erte, 2021. "Deviant or wrong? The effects of norm information on the efficacy of punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 188(C), pages 209-235.
    7. Fanghella, Valeria & Thøgersen, John, 2022. "Experimental evidence of moral cleansing in the interpersonal and environmental domains," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    8. Eugen Dimant & Fabio Galeotti & Marie Claire Villeval, 2024. "Motivated information acquisition and social norm formation," Post-Print hal-04740082, HAL.
    9. Tobias Regner, 2018. "Reciprocity under moral wiggle room: Is it a preference or a constraint?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(4), pages 779-792, December.
    10. Leonard Hoeft & Michael Kurschilgen & Wladislaw Mill & Simone Vannuccini, 2022. "Norms as Obligations," Munich Papers in Political Economy 22, Munich School of Politics and Public Policy and the School of Management at the Technical University of Munich.
    11. Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann, 2021. "Social Epistemology," Post-Print halshs-02431971, HAL.
    12. Heinicke, Franziska & König-Kersting, Christian & Schmidt, Robert, 2022. "Injunctive vs. descriptive social norms and reference group dependence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 195(C), pages 199-218.
    13. Leonard Hoeft & Michael Kurschilgen & Wladislaw Mill & Simone Vannuccini, 2022. "Norms as Obligations," Munich Papers in Political Economy 22, Munich School of Politics and Public Policy and the School of Management at the Technical University of Munich.
    14. Claire Rimbaud & Alice Soldà, 2024. "Avoiding the cost of your conscience: belief dependent preferences and information acquisition," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(3), pages 491-547, July.
    15. Katharina Momsen & Markus Ohndorf, 2023. "Expressive voting versus information avoidance: experimental evidence in the context of climate change mitigation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 194(1), pages 45-74, January.
    16. Romain Espinosa & Bruno Deffains & Christian Thöni, 2020. "Debiasing preferences over redistribution: an experiment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(4), pages 823-843, December.
    17. Loretta Mastroeni & Maurizio Naldi & Pierluigi Vellucci, 2023. "Personal Finance Decisions with Untruthful Advisors: An Agent-Based Model," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 61(4), pages 1477-1522, April.
    18. Katharina Momsen & Markus Ohndorf, 2019. "Information Avoidance, Selective Exposure, and Fake(?) News-A Green Market Experiment," Working Papers 2019-18, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    19. Cristina Bicchieri & Eugen Dimant, 2018. "It's Not A Lie If You Believe It. Lying and Belief Distortion Under Norm-Uncertainty," PPE Working Papers 0012, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    20. Ellingsen, Tore & Mohlin, Erik, 2019. "Decency," Working Papers 2019:3, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    21. Daniela Di Cagno & Arianna Galliera & Werner Güth & Luca Panaccione, 2018. "Intention-Based Sharing," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-24, April.
    22. Rockenbach, Bettina & Tonke, Sebastian & Weiss, Arne R., 2021. "Self-serving behavior of the rich causes contagion effects among the poor," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 289-300.
    23. Katharina Momsen & Markus Ohndorf, 2020. "Expressive Voting vs. Self-Serving Ignorance," Working Papers 2020-33, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    24. Ay, F. Ceren & Berge, Joel W. & Nødtvedt, Katrine B., 2024. "Strategic curiosity: An experimental study of curiosity and dishonesty," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 217(C), pages 287-297.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    norm compliance; uncertainty; experiment; self-serving biases; strategic learning; dictator game;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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