The Emergence of Institutions
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- Sanchez-Pages Santiago & Straub Stéphane, 2010. "The Emergence of Institutions," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-38, September.
- Sanchez-Pages, Santiago & Straub, Stéphane, 2008. "The Emergence of Institutions," IDEI Working Papers 545, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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Cited by:
- Manuel Wäckerle & Bernhard Rengs & Wolfgang Radax, 2014. "An Agent-Based Model of Institutional Life-Cycles," Games, MDPI, vol. 5(3), pages 1-28, August.
- Kai A. Konrad & Wolfgang Leininger, 2007. "Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans," Ruhr Economic Papers 0016, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
- Kai Konrad & Wolfgang Leininger, 2011.
"Self-enforcing norms and efficient non-cooperative collective action in the provision of public goods,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(3), pages 501-520, March.
- Konrad, Kai A. & Leininger, Wolfgang, 2011. "Self-enforcing norms and efficient non-cooperative collective action in the provision of public goods," Munich Reprints in Economics 22075, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Martin Kolmar & Andreas Wagener, 2013. "Inefficiency As A Strategic Device In Group Contests Against Dominant Opponents," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(4), pages 2083-2095, October.
- repec:zbw:rwirep:0016 is not listed on IDEAS
- Konrad, Kai A. & Leininger, Wolfgang, 2007.
"Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans,"
Ruhr Economic Papers
16, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
- Leininger, Wolfgang & Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans," CEPR Discussion Papers 6333, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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More about this item
Keywords
institution; coordination; state of nature; secession;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBA-2006-12-16 (Central Banking)
- NEP-CBE-2006-12-16 (Cognitive and Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CDM-2006-12-16 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DEV-2006-12-16 (Development)
- NEP-GTH-2006-12-16 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2006-12-16 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2006-12-16 (Social Norms and Social Capital)
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