Characterizing pairwise strategy-proof rules in object allocation problems with money
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Cited by:
- Masahiro KAWASAKI & Ryosuke SAKAI & Tomoya KAZUMURA, 2023. "Sequential dictatorship rules in multi-unit objectassignment problems with money," Discussion papers e-23-007, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
- SHINOZAKI, Hiroki, 2024. "Shutting-out-proofness in object allocation problems with money," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-138, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
- Di Feng, 2023. "Endowments-swapping-proofness and Efficiency in Multiple-Type Housing Markets," Discussion Paper Series DP2023-14, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
- SHINOZAKI, Hiroki, 2024. "Shill-proof rules in object allocation problems with money," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-137, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
- Di Feng, 2023. "Efficiency in Multiple-Type Housing Markets," Papers 2308.14989, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
- Masahiro KAWASAKI & Ryosuke SAKAI & Tomoya KAZUMURA, 2024. "Sequential dictatorship rules in multi-unit object assignment problems with money," Discussion papers e-23-007-v2, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2022-09-26 (Economic Design)
- NEP-MIC-2022-09-26 (Microeconomics)
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