[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/dis/wpaper/dis2205.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Newsroom Dilemma

Author

Listed:
  • Ayush Pant
  • Federico Trombetta
Abstract
Conventional wisdom suggests that competition in the modern digital environment is pushing media outlets towards early release of less accurate information. We show that this is not necessarily the case. We argue that two opposing forces determine the resolution of the speed-accuracy trade-off: preemption and reputation. More competitive environments may be more conducive to reputation building. Therefore, it is possible to have better reporting in a more (Internet-driven) competitive world. However, we show that the audience may be worse-off due to another consequence of the Internet – outlets’ better initial information. Finally, we show how a source may exploit the speed-accuracy trade-off to get “unverified facts” out to the audience quickly.

Suggested Citation

  • Ayush Pant & Federico Trombetta, 2022. "The Newsroom Dilemma," DISEIS - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo dis2205, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo (DISEIS).
    • Handle: RePEc:dis:wpaper:dis2205
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dipartimenti.unicatt.it/diseis-wp_2205.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Julia Cage & Nicolas Hervé & Marie-Luce Viaud, 2017. "The Production of Information in an Online World: Is Copy Right?," Working Papers hal-03393171, HAL.
    2. Charles Angelucci & Julia Cage, 2019. "Newspapers in Times of Low Advertising Revenues," SciencePo Working papers hal-03391880, HAL.
    3. Hugo A. Hopenhayn & Francesco Squintani, 2011. "Preemption Games with Private Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 78(2), pages 667-692.
    4. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/4edekc99or8n2bu86nu4ua8adl is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Charles Angelucci & Julia Cagé & Michael Sinkinson, 2024. "Media Competition and News Diets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 62-102, May.
    6. Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2008. "Competition and Truth in the Market for News," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 22(2), pages 133-154, Spring.
    7. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/7jk88md0ar9hga662p2vjjq4kc is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Charles Angelucci & Julia Cagé, 2019. "Newspapers in Times of Low Advertising Revenues," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 319-364, August.
    9. Jean‐Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 2006. "Two‐sided markets: a progress report," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 645-667, September.
    10. Sobbrio, Francesco, 2014. "Citizen-editors' endogenous information acquisition and news accuracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 43-53.
    11. Cagé, Julia, 2020. "Media competition, information provision and political participation: Evidence from French local newspapers and elections, 1944–2014," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    12. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 990-1029, June.
    13. Shapiro, Jesse M., 2016. "Special interests and the media: Theory and an application to climate change," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 91-108.
    14. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(3), pages 383-401.
    15. Matthew Ellman & Fabrizio Germano, 2009. "What do the Papers Sell? A Model of Advertising and Media Bias," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(537), pages 680-704, April.
    16. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/3tcpvf3sd399op9sgtn8tq5bhd is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Matthew Gentzkow, 2014. "Trading Dollars for Dollars: The Price of Attention Online and Offline," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 481-488, May.
    18. Mark Armstrong & Helen Weeds, 2005. "Public Service Broadcasting in the Digital World," Industrial Organization 0507010, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Timothy Besley & Andrea Prat, 2006. "Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 720-736, June.
    20. Fudenberg, Drew & Gilbert, Richard & Stiglitz, Joseph & Tirole, Jean, 1983. "Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 3-31, June.
    21. Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2006. "Media Bias and Reputation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(2), pages 280-316, April.
    22. Julia Cage, 2019. "Media competition, information provision and political participation:Evidence from French local newspapers and elections, 1944–2014," SciencePo Working papers hal-03567022, HAL.
    23. Francesco Drago & Tommaso Nannicini & Francesco Sobbrio, 2014. "Meet the Press: How Voters and Politicians Respond to Newspaper Entry and Exit," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 159-188, July.
    24. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/3tcpvf3sd399op9sgtn8tq5bhd is not listed on IDEAS
    25. Ilan Guttman & Ilan Kremer & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2014. "Not Only What but Also When: A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(8), pages 2400-2420, August.
    26. Mark Armstrong, 2005. "Public service broadcasting," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 26(3), pages 281-299, September.
    27. Charles Angelucci & Julia Cage & Michael Sinkinson, 2020. "Media Competition and News Diets," SciencePo Working papers hal-03393063, HAL.
    28. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/4ec86lkes59hv9tfv77ld1p5fr is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Charles Angelucci & Julia Cagé, 2019. "Newspapers in Times of Low Advertising Revenues," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 319-364, August.
    2. Ozerturk, Saltuk, 2022. "Media access, bias and public opinion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
    3. Charles Angelucci & Julia Cage & Michael Sinkinson, 2020. "Media Competition and News Diets," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03393063, HAL.
    4. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/4edekc99or8n2bu86nu4ua8adl is not listed on IDEAS
    5. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/4edekc99or8n2bu86nu4ua8adl is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Germano, Fabrizio & Meier, Martin, 2013. "Concentration and self-censorship in commercial media," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 117-130.
    7. Cagé, Julia, 2017. "Media Competition, Information Provision and Political Participation: Evidence from French Local Newspapers and Elections, 1944," CEPR Discussion Papers 12198, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Piolatto, Amedeo & Schuett, Florian, 2015. "Media competition and electoral politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 80-93.
    9. Charles Angelucci & Julia Cagé & Michael Sinkinson, 2024. "Media Competition and News Diets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 62-102, May.
    10. Jacopo Perego & Sevgi Yuksel, 2022. "Media Competition and Social Disagreement," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(1), pages 223-265, January.
    11. Cagé, Julia, 2020. "Media competition, information provision and political participation: Evidence from French local newspapers and elections, 1944–2014," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    12. Andina-Díaz, Ascensión & García-Martínez, José A., 2020. "Reputation and news suppression in the media industry," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 240-271.
    13. Piolatto, Amedeo & Schuett, Florian, 2015. "Media competition and electoral politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 80-93.
    14. Federico Vaccari, 2023. "Influential news and policy-making," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1363-1418, November.
    15. Marco Antonielli & Lapo Filistrucchi, 2011. "Collusion and the political differentiation of newspapers," Working Papers 11-26, NET Institute, revised Nov 2011.
    16. Alaoui, Larbi & Germano, Fabrizio, 2020. "Time scarcity and the market for news," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 173-195.
    17. Gehlbach, Scott & Sonin, Konstantin, 2014. "Government control of the media," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 163-171.
    18. repec:tiu:tiucen:2013072 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Sendhil Mullainathan & Andrei Shleifer, 2005. "The Market for News," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1031-1053, September.
    20. Behringer, Stefan & Filistrucchi, Lapo, 2015. "Hotelling competition and political differentiation with more than two newspapers," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 36-49.
    21. Julia Cage, 2019. "Media competition, information provision and political participation:Evidence from French local newspapers and elections, 1944–2014," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03567022, HAL.
    22. Charles Angelucci & Julia Cage, 2019. "Newspapers in Times of Low Advertising Revenues," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03391880, HAL.
    23. Graham Beattie, 2017. "Biased media in an unbiased market," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 37(4), pages 2741-2752.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dis:wpaper:dis2205. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Teodora Erika Uberti (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dicatit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.