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Does the WTO Help Member States Clean Up?

Author

Listed:
  • Susan Ariel Aaronson

    (Department of Economics/Institute for International Economic Policy, George Washington University)

  • M. Rodwan Abouharb

    (University London College)

Abstract
The WTO says nothing about corruption. This paper uses qualitative and quantitative analysis to examine whether the GATT/WTO, without deliberate intent, helps nations improve governance and fight corruption. Under GATT/WTO rules, policymakers are obligated to act in an evenhanded manner, to facilitate transparent trade-related policymaking and to provide due process to such policymaking by allowing individuals to comment on and challenge trade related regulations before they are adopted. Evenhandedness, access to information, and due process are anticorruption counterweights. We hypothesized that we would see both qualitative and quantitative evidence of improvement in these government metrics among developing country WTO members, especially during the accession process. However, that is not what we found; instead our data shows members gradually improve governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Susan Ariel Aaronson & M. Rodwan Abouharb, 2014. "Does the WTO Help Member States Clean Up?," Working Papers 2014-07, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
    • Handle: RePEc:gwi:wpaper:2014-07
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    Cited by:

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    2. Gnangnon, Sèna Kimm, 2022. "Effect of Aid for Trade flows on the Accession to the World Trade Organization," EconStor Preprints 261331, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
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    4. Lucia Tajoli, 2022. "Too much of a good thing? Russia-EU international trade relations at times of war," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 49(4), pages 807-834, December.
    5. Gnangnon, Sèna Kimm, 2023. "Effect of the duration of membership in the GATT/WTO on economic growth volatility," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 448-467.
    6. Gnangnon, Sèna Kimm, 2021. "WTO membership, the membership duration and the utilization of non-reciprocal trade preferences offered by the QUAD Countries," EconStor Preprints 247265, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    7. Gnangnon, Sèna Kimm, 2022. "Effect of the Duration of Membership in the GATT/WTO on Human Development in Developed and Developing Countries," EconStor Preprints 265061, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    8. Gnangnon, Sèna Kimm, 2023. "Duration of membership in the world trade organization and investment-oriented remittances inflows," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 258-277.
    9. Choudhury, Sanchari, 2019. "WTO membership and corruption," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    10. Mai, Nhat Chi, 2016. "Beyond trade: the impact of WTO transparency norms on socialist-oriented countries with an emphasis on Vietnam's legal reform," OSF Preprints bgzhv, Center for Open Science.

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    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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