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Optimal Bunching without Optimal Control

Author

Listed:
  • Nöldeke, Georg

    (University of Basel)

  • Samuelson, Larry
Abstract
This paper presents simple su±cient conditions under which optimal bunches in NEWLINE adverse-selection principal-agent problems can be characterized without using optimal control NEWLINE theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Nöldeke, Georg & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Optimal Bunching without Optimal Control," Working papers 2006/12, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    • Handle: RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2006/12
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ambrus, Attila & Egorov, Georgy, 2017. "Delegation and nonmonetary incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 101-135.
    2. Araujo, Aloisio & Moreira, Humberto, 2010. "Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 1113-1141, May.
    3. Kos, Nenad & Messner, Matthias, 2013. "Extremal incentive compatible transfers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 134-164.
    4. Brett, Craig & Weymark, John A., 2016. "Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with a minimum-utility constraint," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 18-31.
    5. Araujo, A. & Moreira, H. & Vieira, S., 2015. "The marginal tariff approach without single-crossing," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 166-184.
    6. Dan Cao & Roger Lagunoff, 2016. "The Design of Optimal Collateralized Contracts," Working Papers gueconwpa~16-16-01, Georgetown University, Department of Economics, revised 01 Jun 2017.
    7. Christian Ewerhart, 2013. "Regular type distributions in mechanism design and $$\rho $$ -concavity," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(3), pages 591-603, August.
    8. David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017. "A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(2), pages 816-852.
    9. Zheng, Mingli & Wang, Chong & Li, Chaozheng, 2015. "Optimal nonlinear pricing by a monopolist with information ambiguity," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 60-66.
    10. Brett, Craig & Weymark, John A., 2017. "Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 172-188.
    11. Castillo, Marco & Petrie, Ragan, 2020. "Optimal Incentives to Give," IZA Discussion Papers 13321, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    12. Ruiz del Portal, X., 2009. "A general principal-agent setting with non-differentiable mechanisms: Some examples," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 262-278, March.
    13. Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2017. "Sequential versus static screening: An equivalence result," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 317-328.
    14. Mailath, George J. & Nöldeke, Georg, 2008. "Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 97-125, May.
    15. Artyom Shneyerov, 2014. "An optimal slow Dutch auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(3), pages 577-602, November.
    16. , & ,, 2012. "Optimal insurance with adverse selection," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    17. Toikka, Juuso, 2011. "Ironing without control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2510-2526.
    18. Herbst, Holger, 2015. "Pricing Heterogeneous Goods under Ex Post Private Information," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 01/2015, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Principal-Agent Problem; Bunching; Nonlinear Pricing; Assignment Approach;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C40 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - General
    • C80 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - General

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