[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bie/wpaper/384.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control

Author

Listed:
  • Çiftçi, Baris

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

  • Dimitrov, Dinko

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

Abstract
In this paper we study hedonic coalition formation games in which players' preferences over coalitions are induced by a semi-value of a monotonic simple game with veto control. We consider partitions of the player set in which the winning coalition contains the union of all minimal winning coalitions, and show that each of these partitions belongs to the strict core of the hedonic game. Exactly such coalition structures constitute the strict core when the simple game is symmetric. Provided that the veto player set is not a winning coalition in a symmetric simple game, then the partition containing the grand coalition is the unique strictly core stable coalition structure.

Suggested Citation

  • Çiftçi, Baris & Dimitrov, Dinko, 2011. "Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 384, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    • Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:384
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2315533/2319810
    File Function: First Version, 2006
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carreras, Francesc, 1996. "On the Existence and Formation of Partnerships," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 54-67, January.
    2. Pradeep Dubey & Abraham Neyman & Robert J. Weber, 1979. "Value Theory without Efficiency," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 513, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    3. Robert J. Weber, 1977. "Probabilistic Values for Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 471R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    4. R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), 2002. "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 3, number 3.
    5. Barış Çiftçi & Peter Borm & Herbert Hamers, 2010. "Population monotonic path schemes for simple games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(2), pages 205-218, August.
    6. Dinko Dimitrov & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2006. "Government versus Opposition: Who Should be Who in the 16th German Bundestag?," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 89(2), pages 115-128, November.
    7. Carreras, Francesc & Freixas, Josep & Puente, Maria Albina, 2003. "Semivalues as power indices," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 149(3), pages 676-687, September.
    8. Sergiu Hart, 2006. "Shapley Value," Discussion Paper Series dp421, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    9. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1983. "On Weighted Shapley Values," Discussion Papers 602, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    10. Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 2002. "Variations on the shapley value," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 54, pages 2055-2076, Elsevier.
    11. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
    12. Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
    13. Pradeep Dubey & Abraham Neyman & Robert James Weber, 1981. "Value Theory Without Efficiency," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 122-128, February.
    14. Sprumont, Yves, 1990. "Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 378-394, December.
    15. Shapley, L. S. & Shubik, Martin, 1954. "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 787-792, September.
    16. AUMANN, Robert J. & DREZE, Jacques H., 1974. "Cooperative games with coalition structures," LIDAM Reprints CORE 217, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Barış Çiftçi & Peter Borm & Herbert Hamers, 2010. "Population monotonic path schemes for simple games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(2), pages 205-218, August.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dimitrov, Dinko & Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2011. "Coalition formation in simple Games. the semistrict core," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 378, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    2. Geoffroy de Clippel & Roberto Serrano, 2008. "Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(6), pages 1413-1436, November.
    3. Barış Çiftçi & Peter Borm & Herbert Hamers, 2010. "Population monotonic path schemes for simple games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(2), pages 205-218, August.
    4. Dimitrov, Dinko & Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2008. "Stable governments and the semistrict core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 460-475, March.
    5. Stefano Benati & Giuseppe Vittucci Marzetti, 2013. "Probabilistic spatial power indexes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(2), pages 391-410, February.
    6. Giulia Bernardi & Roberto Lucchetti, 2015. "Generating Semivalues via Unanimity Games," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 166(3), pages 1051-1062, September.
    7. Carreras, Francesc & Giménez, José Miguel, 2010. "Semivalues: power,potential and multilinear extensions," MPRA Paper 27620, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Ciftci, B.B., 2009. "A cooperative approach to sequencing and connection problems," Other publications TiSEM b0f08a17-4734-4d57-ad66-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2005. "A critical reappraisal of some voting power paradoxes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(1), pages 17-41, July.
    10. Dinko Dimitrov & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2006. "Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core," Working Papers 2006.72, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    11. Karos, Dominik, 2014. "Coalition formation in general apex games under monotonic power indices," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 239-252.
    12. Federico Valenciano & Annick Laruelle, 2003. "Potential, Value And Probability," Working Papers. Serie AD 2003-01, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    13. László Á. Kóczy, 2018. "Partition Function Form Games," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-319-69841-0, September.
    14. Dinko Dimitrov & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2008. "A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(4), pages 571-579, May.
    15. Michel Le Breton & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2017. "Alliances Électorales et Gouvernementales : La Contribution de la Théorie des Jeux Coopératifs à la Science Politique," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 127(4), pages 637-736.
    16. Gustavo Bergantiños & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "The Consistent Coalitional Value," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 30(4), pages 832-851, November.
    17. Dominik Karos, 2012. "Coalition Formation in Generalized Apex Games," Working Papers 2012.38, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    18. Jacob North Clark & Stephen Montgomery-Smith, 2018. "Shapley-like values without symmetry," Papers 1809.07747, arXiv.org, revised May 2019.
    19. Jian Yang, 2023. "Partition-based Stability of Coalitional Games," Papers 2304.10651, arXiv.org.
    20. Saari, Donald G. & Sieberg, Katri K., 2001. "Some Surprising Properties of Power Indices," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 241-263, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strict core; Semi-value; Shapley value; Banzhaf value; Simple game; Hedonic game;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:384. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Bettina Weingarten (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/imbiede.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.