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Optimal Currency Area and European Monetary Membership: Economics and Political Economy

Author

Listed:
  • Donato Masciandaro
  • Davide Romelli
Abstract
The recent Global Crisis are posing challenges to the stability of the European Monetary Integration process. The pillar of the European Monetary Integration is the evolution of the European Monetary Union (EMU). Being the EMU the establishment of a currency union, such as international agreement implies for the member countries the inability to use exchange rates and national monetary policy to deal with real and financial shocks. It is natural then to wonder under which conditions the net benefits of a currency union are likely to be positive, comparing the abovementioned limitations with the medium long term gains in having on the one side perpetual fixed exchange rates and on the other side the delegation of the monetary policy action to an independent and supranational central bank, i.e. the European Central Bank (ECB) that manages the European Monetary Union (EMU). A natural question arises: how to evaluate the economic pros and cons in having the EMU membership? The aim of this paper is to analyse the economics and the political economy of the EMU membership.

Suggested Citation

  • Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2017. "Optimal Currency Area and European Monetary Membership: Economics and Political Economy," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1760, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    • Handle: RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp1760
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    OPTIMAL CURRENCY AREA; EUROPEAN MONETARY INTEGRATION; MONETARY POLICY; POLITICAL ECONOMICS;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E03 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Behavioral Macroeconomics

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