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Trade and Domestic Policies in Models With Monopolistic Competition

Author

Listed:
  • Alessia Campolmi
  • Harald Fadinger
  • Chiara Forlati
Abstract
We consider unilateral and strategic trade and domestic policies in single and multi-sector versions of models with CES preferences and monopolistic competition featuring homogeneous (Krugman, 1980) or heterogeneous firms (Melitz, 2003). We first solve the world-planner problem to identify the efficiency wedges between the planner and the market allocation. We then derive a common welfare decomposition in terms of macro variables that incorporates all general-equilibrium eects of trade and domestic policies and decomposes them into consumption and production-eciency wedges and terms-of-trade effects. We show that the Nash equilibrium when both domestic and trade policies are available is characterized by first-best-level labor subsidies that achieve production efficiency, and inefficient import subsidies and export taxes that aim at improving domestic terms of trade. Since the terms-of-trade externality is the only beggar-thy-neighbor motive, it remains the only reason for signing trade agreements in this general class of models. Finally, we show that when trade agreements only limit the strategic use of trade taxes but do not require coordination of domestic policies, the latter are set inefficiently in the Nash equilibrium in order to manipulate the terms of trade.

Suggested Citation

  • Alessia Campolmi & Harald Fadinger & Chiara Forlati, 2018. "Trade and Domestic Policies in Models With Monopolistic Competition," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2018_049, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2018_049
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    File URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp049
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Nocco, Antonella & Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P. & Salto, Matteo, 2019. "Geography, competition, and optimal multilateral trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 145-161.
    2. Gene M. Grossman & Phillip McCalman & Robert W. Staiger, 2021. "The “New” Economics of Trade Agreements: From Trade Liberalization to Regulatory Convergence?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(1), pages 215-249, January.
    3. Teodora Borota & Fabrice Defever & Giammario Impullitti, 2019. "Innovation union: Costs and benefits of innovation policy coordination," Discussion Papers 2019-14, University of Nottingham, GEP.
    4. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2020. "When Tariffs Disturb Global Supply Chains," NBER Working Papers 27722, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Arnaud Costinot & Andrés Rodríguez‐Clare & Iván Werning, 2020. "Micro to Macro: Optimal Trade Policy With Firm Heterogeneity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(6), pages 2739-2776, November.
    6. Gene M Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2021. "When Tariffs Disrupt Global Supply Chains," Working Papers 274, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Heterogeneous Firms; Trade Policy; Domestic Policy; Trade Agreements; Terms of Trade; Efficiency; Tariffs and Subsidies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission

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