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Specialisation in mortgage risk under Basel II

Author

Listed:
  • Eckley, Peter

    (Bank of England)

  • Benetton, Matteo

    (LSE)

  • Latsi, Georgia

    (Independent)

  • Garbarino, Nicola

    (Bank of England)

  • Kirwin, Liam

    (Bank of England)

Abstract
Since Basel II was introduced in 2008, two approaches to calculating bank capital requirements have co-existed: lenders’ internal models, and a less risk-sensitive standardised approach. Using a unique dataset covering 7 million UK mortgages for 2005–15, and novel identification, we provide empirical evidence that the differences between these approaches cause lenders to specialise. This leads to systemic concentration of high-risk mortgages in lenders with less sophisticated risk management. Our results have broad implications for the design of the international bank capital framework.

Suggested Citation

  • Eckley, Peter & Benetton, Matteo & Latsi, Georgia & Garbarino, Nicola & Kirwin, Liam, 2017. "Specialisation in mortgage risk under Basel II," Bank of England working papers 639, Bank of England.
    • Handle: RePEc:boe:boeewp:0639
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    Cited by:

    1. Viral V. Acharya & Katharina Bergant & Matteo Crosignani & Tim Eisert & Fergal Mccann, 2022. "The Anatomy of the Transmission of Macroprudential Policies," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 77(5), pages 2533-2575, October.
    2. Saha, Asish & Rooj, Debasis & Sengupta, Reshmi, 2023. "Macroprudential Policy and mortgage leverage decisions—Evidence from micro data," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 1430-1444.
    3. Kabundi, Alain & De Simone, Francisco Nadal, 2022. "Euro area banking and monetary policy shocks in the QE era," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    4. Tuuli, Saara, 2019. "Model-based regulation and firms' access to finance," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 4/2019, Bank of Finland.
    5. Matteo Benetton, 2017. "Lenders' Competition and Macro-prudential Regulation: A Model of the UK Mortgage Supermarket," 2017 Meeting Papers 1001, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Nam, Rachel J., 2022. "Open banking and customer data sharing: Implications for FinTech borrowers," SAFE Working Paper Series 364, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    7. Fisher, Paul & Grout, Paul, 2017. "Competition and prudential regulation," Bank of England working papers 675, Bank of England.
    8. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2019_004 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Tuuli, Saara, 2019. "Model-based regulation and firms' access to finance," Research Discussion Papers 4/2019, Bank of Finland.
    10. Aikman, David & Haldane, Andrew & Hinterschweiger, Marc & Kapadia, Sujit, 2018. "Rethinking financial stability," Bank of England working papers 712, Bank of England.
    11. Miller, Sam & Wanengkirtyo, Boromeus, 2020. "Liquidity and monetary transmission: a quasi-experimental approach," Bank of England working papers 891, Bank of England.
    12. Dominika Ehrenbergerová & Martin Hodula & Zuzana Gric, 2022. "Does capital-based regulation affect bank pricing policy?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 61(2), pages 135-167, April.
    13. Benbouzid, Nadia & Kumar, Abhishek & Mallick, Sushanta K. & Sousa, Ricardo M. & Stojanovic, Aleksandar, 2022. "Bank credit risk and macro-prudential policies: Role of counter-cyclical capital buffer," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    14. Martin Birn & Olivier de Bandt & Simon Firestone & Matías Gutiérrez Girault & Diana Hancock & Tord Krogh & Hitoshi Mio & Donald P. Morgan & Ajay Palvia & Valerio Scalone & Michael Straughan & Arzu Ulu, 2020. "The Costs and Benefits of Bank Capital—A Review of the Literature," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 13(4), pages 1-25, April.
    15. Cristina Jude & Grégory Levieuge, 2024. "Doubling Down: The Synergy of CCyB Release and Monetary Policy Easing," Working papers 961, Banque de France.
    16. Dal Borgo, Mariela, 2022. "Internal models for deposits: Effects on banks' capital and interest rate risk of assets," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
    17. Donat Kim & Eszter Raciborski & Balint Vargedo, 2024. "Experiences from the MNB's Green Preferential Capital Requirement Programme and the Extension of the Programme," Financial and Economic Review, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary), vol. 23(3), pages 193-209.
    18. Damen, Sven & Schildermans, Stef, 2022. "Capital requirements, mortgage rates and house prices," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    19. Hinterschweiger, Marc & Neumann, Tobias & Saporta, Victoria, 2018. "Risk sensitivity and risk shifting in banking regulation," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 44, Bank of England.
    20. Song, Fenghua & Thakor, Anjan, 2022. "Ethics, capital and talent competition in banking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Capital regulation; banking; mortgages; specialisation; risk-taking; Basel II;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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