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Resource Harvesting Regulation and Enforcement: An Evolutionary Approach

Author

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  • Yannis Petrohilos-Andrianos
  • Anastasios Xepapadeas
Abstract
We study the evolution of compliance and regulation in a common pool resource setup with myopic appropriators whose decision on whether to comply or not with the harvesting rule is a result of imitation as described by a proportional rule. The regulator first sets the optimal quota and then harvesters can choose between compliance and violation. We investigate myopic regulation and optimal regulation regimes with both proportional and non-proportional fine formulation and and an endogenized probability of audition. The equilibria are then characterized in terms of their stability properties.

Suggested Citation

  • Yannis Petrohilos-Andrianos & Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2015. "Resource Harvesting Regulation and Enforcement: An Evolutionary Approach," DEOS Working Papers 1518, Athens University of Economics and Business.
    • Handle: RePEc:aue:wpaper:1518
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    20. repec:hhs:iuiwop:487 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Giovanni Villani & Marta Biancardi, 2022. "Competition and strategic alliance in R&D investments: a real option game approach with multiple experiments," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 17(1), pages 63-86, January.
    2. Marta Biancardi & Gianluca Iannucci & Giovanni Villani, 2023. "Groundwater management and illegality in a differential-evolutionary framework," Computational Management Science, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 1-17, December.
    3. Marta Biancardi & Gianluca Iannucci & Giovanni Villani, 2022. "An evolutionary game on compliant and non-compliant firms in groundwater exploitation," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 318(2), pages 831-847, November.
    4. Halkos, George E. & Papageorgiou, George J. & Halkos, Emmanuel G. & Papageorgiou, John G., 2020. "Public debt games with corruption and tax evasion," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 250-261.
    5. Etro, Federico, 2017. "Research in economics and game theory. A 70th anniversary," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 1-7.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Common pool resources; replicator dynamics; optimal regulation; compliance;
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