Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for all Distributions
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Cited by:
- Andrew Komo & Scott Duke Kominers & Tim Roughgarden, 2024. "Shill-Proof Auctions," Papers 2404.00475, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.
- Matheus V. X. Ferreira & David C. Parkes, 2022. "Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules," Papers 2209.15569, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
- Maryam Bahrani & Pranav Garimidi & Tim Roughgarden, 2023. "Transaction Fee Mechanism Design with Active Block Producers," Papers 2307.01686, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
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NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DEM-2022-07-18 (Demographic Economics)
- NEP-DES-2022-07-18 (Economic Design)
- NEP-MIC-2022-07-18 (Microeconomics)
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