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Predicting Auction Price of Vehicle License Plate with Deep Residual Learning

Author

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  • Vinci Chow
Abstract
Due to superstition, license plates with desirable combinations of characters are highly sought after in China, fetching prices that can reach into the millions in government-held auctions. Despite the high stakes involved, there has been essentially no attempt to provide price estimates for license plates. We present an end-to-end neural network model that simultaneously predict the auction price, gives the distribution of prices and produces latent feature vectors. While both types of neural network architectures we consider outperform simpler machine learning methods, convolutional networks outperform recurrent networks for comparable training time or model complexity. The resulting model powers our online price estimator and search engine.

Suggested Citation

  • Vinci Chow, 2019. "Predicting Auction Price of Vehicle License Plate with Deep Residual Learning," Papers 1910.04879, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1910.04879
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    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1910.04879
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ng, Travis & Chong, Terence & Du, Xin, 2010. "The value of superstitions," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 293-309, June.
    2. Woo, Chi-Keung & Horowitz, Ira & Luk, Stephen & Lai, Aaron, 2008. "Willingness to pay and nuanced cultural cues: Evidence from Hong Kong's license-plate auction market," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 35-53, February.
    3. Ashenfelter, Orley, 1989. "How Auctions Work for Wine and Art," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 23-36, Summer.
    4. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    5. Woo, Chi-Keung & Kwok, Raymond H. F., 1994. "Vanity, superstition and auction price," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 44(4), pages 389-395, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Zakonnik Łukasz & Czerwonka Piotr & Zajdel Radosław, 2022. "Online Auctions End Time and its Impact on Sales Success – Analysis of the Odds Ratio on a Selected Central European Market," Folia Oeconomica Stetinensia, Sciendo, vol. 22(2), pages 246-264, December.

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