Professionalism, Latent Professionalism and Organizational Demands for Health Care Quality in a Developing Country
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DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.42883
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- Lewis, Maureen & Pettersson, Gunilla, 2009. "Governance in health care delivery : raising performance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5074, The World Bank.
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Health Economics and Policy;Statistics
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