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Distributive Politics and the Benefits of Decentralisation

Author

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  • Lockwood, Ben
Abstract
This paper integrates the distributive politics literature with the literature on decentralization by incorporating inter-regional project externalities into a standard model of distributive policy. A key …nding is that the degree of uniformity (or “universalism”) of the provision of regional projects is endogenous, and depends on the strength of the externality. The welfare bene…ts of decentralization, and the performance of “constitutional rules” (such as majority voting) which may be used to choose between decentralization and centralization, are then discussed in this framework.

Suggested Citation

  • Lockwood, Ben, "undated". "Distributive Politics and the Benefits of Decentralisation," Economic Research Papers 268795, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:uwarer:268795
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.268795
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    Cited by:

    1. Ben Lockwood, 2002. "Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(2), pages 313-337.
    2. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    3. Mariano Tommasi & Federico Weinschelbaum, 1999. "A Principal-Agent Building Block for the Study of Decentralization and Integration," Working Papers 20, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Nov 1999.
    4. Guillaume Cheikbossian & Nicolas Marceau, 2007. "Why Is Law Enforcement Decentralized?," Cahiers de recherche 0719, CIRPEE.
    5. Mark Gradstein, 2000. "The Political Economy of Sustainable Federations," CESifo Working Paper Series 315, CESifo.
    6. Michela Redoano, 2010. "Does Centralization Affect the Number and Size of Lobbies?," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(3), pages 407-435, June.
    7. Lulfesmann, Christoph, 2002. "Central governance or subsidiarity: A property-rights approach to federalism," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1379-1397, September.
    8. Iregui, Ana Maria, 2005. "Decentralised provision of quasi-private goods: The case of Colombia," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 683-706, July.
    9. Brian Knight, 2004. "Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power, and the Distribution of Federal Funds: Evidence from the U.S. Senate," NBER Working Papers 10385, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Sebastian Eckardt, 2007. "Political Accountability, Fiscal Conditions, and Local Government Performance – Cross-Sectional Evidence from Indonesia," Working Papers 02-2007, Institute of Local Public Finance.
    11. Massimo Bordignon & Paolo Manasse & Guido Tabellini, 2001. "Optimal Regional Redistribution under Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 709-723, June.
    12. Brian Knight, 2004. "Bargaining in Legislatures: An Empirical Investigation," NBER Working Papers 10530, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Knight, Brian, 2004. "Parochial interests and the centralized provision of local public goods: evidence from congressional voting on transportation projects," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 845-866, March.
    14. Marco Lossani & Piergiovanna Natale & Patrizio Tirelli, 1999. "Disegno delle istituzioni e stabilità finanziaria nell'Unione Monetaria Europea," Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 2, pages 243-270.
    15. Lockwood, Ben, 2000. "The Assignment of Powers in Federal and Unitary States," Economic Research Papers 269340, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    16. Kessler, Anke S. & Lulfesmann, Christoph & Myers, Gordon M., 2003. "Economic versus political symmetry and the welfare concern with market integration and tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 847-865, May.
    17. Fabio Fiorillo & Agnese Sacchi, 2011. "Free-riding or Internalizing? An Opportunistic View on Decentralization versus Centralization," CESifo Working Paper Series 3328, CESifo.
    18. Fabio Fiorillo & Agnese Sacchi, 2012. "The Political Economy of the Standard Level of Services: The Role of Income Distribution," CESifo Working Paper Series 3696, CESifo.
    19. Feidler, Janos & Staal, Klaas, 2008. "Centralized and decentralized provision of public goods," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 241, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    20. Derek Clark & Christian Riis, 2008. "Rational benevolence in small committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 134(3), pages 139-146, March.
    21. B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel & Luis Rayo, 2002. "Democratic Policy Making with Real-Time Agenda Setting: Part 1," NBER Working Papers 8973, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Agricultural and Food Policy; Political Economy;

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution

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