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Using Field Experiments to Explore the Use of Multiple Bidding Rounds in Conservation Auctions

Author

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  • Rolfe, John
  • Windle, Jill
Abstract
Conservation auctions such as the Conservation Reserve Program in the United States and the BushTender Program in Australia have been used to identify landholders who can provide on-farm conservation and biodiversity protection actions at lowest cost. These conservation auctions are typically framed as closed, discriminatory, single round, first-price auctions, and are based on the assumption that landholders will offer bids determined by their 'independent private values'. However bid values may also be influenced by other factors such as concerns about 'winner's curse', a desire to capture economic rent, and premiums for risk and uncertainty factors. Sealed, single round auctions may exacerbate information gaps and uncertainty factors because of the limited information flows compared to traditional market exchanges and open, ascending auctions. In this paper, the cost-efficiencies of a multiple round auction for landholder management actions are explored with the use of field experiments. Results suggest that multiple round auctions may be associated with efficiency gains, particularly in initial rounds. However, multiple round auctions can also involve higher transaction and administration costs, so the net advantages need to be assessed on a case by case basis before these are used to purchase environmental services.

Suggested Citation

  • Rolfe, John & Windle, Jill, 2006. "Using Field Experiments to Explore the Use of Multiple Bidding Rounds in Conservation Auctions," Discussion Papers 25801, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:iaaedp:25801
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.25801
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Banerjee, Simanti & Kwasnica, Anthony M & Shortle, James S, 2011. "An Iterative Auction for Spatially Contiguous Land Management: An Experimental Analysis," Stirling Economics Discussion Papers 2011-19, University of Stirling, Division of Economics.
    3. Avitia, Jessica & Costa-Font, Montserrat & Gil, Jose Maria & Lusk, Jayson L. & Echeverria, Gemma, 2012. "The Role of sensory experience on Spanish consumer’s willingness to pay for sustainable produced food," 2012 Conference, August 18-24, 2012, Foz do Iguacu, Brazil 126545, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    4. Cardona Santos, Elsa & Storm, Hugo & Rasch, Sebastian, 2021. "The cost-effectiveness of conservation auctions in the presence of asset specificity: An agent-based model," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    5. Glebe, Thilo W., 2011. "Tendering conservation contracts: Should information on environmental benefits be disclosed or concealed?," 2011 International Congress, August 30-September 2, 2011, Zurich, Switzerland 114625, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    6. Nguyen, Chi & Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe, 2023. "Assessing the performance of agglomeration bonus in budget-constrained conservation auctions," 97th Annual Conference, March 27-29, 2023, Warwick University, Coventry, UK 334544, Agricultural Economics Society - AES.

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