Limiting Court Behavior: A Case for High Minimum Sentences and Low Maximum Ones
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- Pallage, Stephane & Demougin, Dominique, 2003. "Limiting court behavior: a case for high minimum sentences and low maximum ones," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 309-321, September.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Bruno Deffains & Roberto Galbiati & Sebastien Rouillon, 2009.
"Punishment should fit the crime: an assessment of the French reform of minimum mandatory penalties,"
Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 8(3), pages 161-175, December.
- Bruno Deffains & Roberto Gabialti & Sébastien Rouillon, 2009. "Punishment should fit the crime: An assessment of the French reform of minimum mandatory penalties," Post-Print hal-00391095, HAL.
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More about this item
Keywords
Maximum and minimum penalties; sentencing guidelines; social optimum;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
- K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2000-01-17 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-LAW-2000-01-17 (Law and Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2000-01-17 (Microeconomics)
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