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On the Evolution of the Rules versus Discretion Debate

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  • Dellas, Harris
  • Tavlas, George
Abstract
We discuss the evolution of the debate on policy rules vs discretion. Doctrinal historians place the starting point of the debate in the nineteenth-century controversy between the Currency and Banking Schools in Britain. We establish that this controversy was not about discretion but about the degree of activism under a single rule -- that of the gold standard. The rules vs discretion issue originated with Henry Simons and the Chicago School in the 1930s, and came to center stage following the Great Inflation in the 1970s. Both the 1930s and 1970s literatures were triggered by monetary-policy failures. The modern literature’s main innovations concern its (1) comparison of discretion to optimal policy rather than just to rules, (2) shift of focus to benevolent governments that lack commitment, (3) demonstration of discretion’s inefficiencies in both stochastic and deterministic environments, and (4) support of activistic policy rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Dellas, Harris & Tavlas, George, 2021. "On the Evolution of the Rules versus Discretion Debate," CEPR Discussion Papers 15976, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15976
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. D E W Laidler, 2002. "Rules, Discretion and Financial Crises in Classical and Neoclassical Monetary Economics," Economic Issues Journal Articles, Economic Issues, vol. 7(2), pages 11-34, September.
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    3. Calvo, Guillermo A, 1978. "On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1411-1428, November.
    4. Henry C. Simons, 1936. "Rules versus Authorities in Monetary Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(1), pages 1-1.
    5. Nelson, Edward, 2020. "Milton Friedman and Economic Debate in the United States, 1932–1972, Volume 2," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226684895, April.
    6. Goodhart, Charles & Jensen, Meinhard, 2015. "Currency School versus Banking School: an ongoing confrontation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 64068, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    8. Nelson, Edward, 2020. "Milton Friedman and Economic Debate in the United States, 1932–1972, Volume 1," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226683775, April.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Eleftheriou, Maria & Kouretas, Georgios P., 2023. "Monetary policy rules and inflation control in the US," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 119(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rules versus discretion; Monetary policy; Modern debate; Chicago school; Currency school; Banking school;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B22 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Macroeconomics
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

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