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A Stepping Stone Approach to Understanding Harmful Norms

Author

Listed:
  • La Ferrara, Eliana
  • Gulesci, Selim
  • Jindani, Sam
  • Smerdon, David
  • Sulaiman, Munshi
  • Young, H. Peyton
Abstract
Harmful social norms often persist despite legal and economic sanctions against them. Can the abandonment of a harmful norm be facilitated by the presence of a ‘mildly harmful’ alternative that may act as a stepping stone in the medium run? Or will this become a new absorbing norm? We propose a dynamic, game-theoretic model to analyze this question, focusing on interim dynamics. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a stepping stone transition, which involve as key parameters the social penalty factors and the difference in intrinsic utilities of the various actions. We explore the implications of the model using original data on female genital cutting in Somalia, where a transition is underway from an extremely invasive to a milder form of cutting. The framework is general and can be applied to other examples, both contemporary and historical, including footbinding, dueling, child marriage and smoking. Our analysis underlines the importance of considering intermediate alternatives when formulating policies against harmful norms.

Suggested Citation

  • La Ferrara, Eliana & Gulesci, Selim & Jindani, Sam & Smerdon, David & Sulaiman, Munshi & Young, H. Peyton, 2021. "A Stepping Stone Approach to Understanding Harmful Norms," CEPR Discussion Papers 15776, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15776
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Webb, Duncan, 2024. "Silence to Solidarity: Using Group Dynamics to Reduce Anti-Transgender Discrimination in India," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) 2402, CEPREMAP.
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    3. Kipchumba, Elijah & Porter, Catherine & Serra, Danila & Sulaiman, Munshi, 2024. "The Impact of Role Models on Youths' Aspirations, Gender Attitudes and Education in Somalia," IZA Discussion Papers 17261, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social norms; Norm dynamics; Female genital cutting; Female genital mutilation; Fgc; Fgm;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General

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