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Searching Forever After

Author

Listed:
  • Antler, Yair
  • Bachi, Benjamin
Abstract
We study a model of two-sided search in which agents' reasoning is coarse. In equilibrium, the most desirable agents behave as if they were fully rational, while, for all other agents, coarse reasoning results in overoptimism with regard to their prospects in the market. Consequently, they search longer than optimal. Moreover, agents with intermediate match values may search indefinitely while all other agents eventually marry. We show that the share of eternal singles converges monotonically to 1 as search frictions vanish. Thus, improvements in the search technology may backfire and even lead to market failure.

Suggested Citation

  • Antler, Yair & Bachi, Benjamin, 2019. "Searching Forever After," CEPR Discussion Papers 14103, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14103
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Adachi, Hiroyuki, 2003. "A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(2), pages 182-198, December.
    2. Robert Shimer & Lones Smith, 2000. "Assortative Matching and Search," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 343-370, March.
    3. Eeckhout, Jan, 1999. "Bilateral Search and Vertical Heterogeneity," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(4), pages 869-887, November.
    4. Philippe Jehiel, 2018. "Investment Strategy and Selection Bias: An Equilibrium Perspective on Overoptimism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(6), pages 1582-1597, June.
    5. Hector Chade & Jan Eeckhout & Lones Smith, 2017. "Sorting through Search and Matching Models in Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 55(2), pages 493-544, June.
    6. Jehiel, Philippe, 2005. "Analogy-based expectation equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 81-104, August.
    7. Bloch, Francis & Ryder, Harl, 2000. "Two-Sided Search, Marriages, and Matchmakers," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 93-115, February.
    8. Michele Piccione & Ariel Rubinstein, 2003. "Modeling the Economic Interaction of Agents With Diverse Abilities to Recognize Equilibrium Patterns," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(1), pages 212-223, March.
    9. Chade, Hector, 2006. "Matching with noise and the acceptance curse," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 81-113, July.
    10. Lones Smith, 2006. "The Marriage Model with Search Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(6), pages 1124-1146, December.
    11. Yair Antler, 2015. "Two-Sided Matching with Endogenous Preferences," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 241-258, August.
    12. Ken Burdett & Melvyn G. Coles, 1997. "Marriage and Class," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(1), pages 141-168.
    13. Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler, 2014. "Reference Dependence and Labor Market Fluctuations," NBER Macroeconomics Annual, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 159-200.
    14. Chade, Hector, 2001. "Two-sided search and perfect segregation with fixed search costs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 31-51, July.
    15. Ignacio Esponda, 2008. "Behavioral Equilibrium in Economies with Adverse Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1269-1291, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Berman, Ron & Heller, Yuval, 2020. "Naive Analytics Equilibrium," MPRA Paper 103824, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Karle, Heiko & Schumacher, Heiner & Vølund, Rune, 2023. "Consumer loss aversion and scale-dependent psychological switching costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 214-237.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Boundedly rational expectations; Two-sided search; Matching; Dating; Marriage market; Coarse reasoning;
    All these keywords.

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