[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/13417.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Does pre-play social interaction improve negotiation outcomes?

Author

Listed:
  • Cabrales, Antonio
  • Brañas, Pablo
  • Mateu, Guillermo
  • Sánchez, Anxo
  • Sutan, Angela
Abstract
We study experimentally the impact of pre-play social interactions on negotiations. These interactions are often complex. Thus, we attempt to isolate the impact of several of its more common components: conversations, food, and beverages, which could be alcoholic or nonalcoholic. To do this, our subjects take part in a standardized negotiation (complex and simple) under six conditions: without interaction, interaction only, and interactions with water, wine, water and food and wine and food. We find that none of the treatments improve the outcomes over the treatment without interactions. We also study trust and reciprocity in the same context. For all-male groups, we find the same lack of superiority of interaction treatments over no interaction. For all-female groups, some very simple social interactions have a positive impact on trust.

Suggested Citation

  • Cabrales, Antonio & Brañas, Pablo & Mateu, Guillermo & Sánchez, Anxo & Sutan, Angela, 2018. "Does pre-play social interaction improve negotiation outcomes?," CEPR Discussion Papers 13417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13417
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP13417
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kenneth Clark & Stephen Kay & Martin Sefton, 2001. "When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(4), pages 495-515.
    2. Bochet, Olivier & Page, Talbot & Putterman, Louis, 2006. "Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 11-26, May.
    3. Yann Algan & Pierre Cahuc, 2010. "Inherited Trust and Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2060-2092, December.
    4. Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2002. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1644-1655, December.
    5. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/432sbils8u9t7qa99cii5psht1 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Yufei Yuan & Milena Head & Mei Du, 2003. "The Effects of Multimedia Communication on Web-Based Negotiation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 89-109, March.
    7. Valley, Kathleen & Thompson, Leigh & Gibbons, Robert & Bazerman, Max H., 2002. "How Communication Improves Efficiency in Bargaining Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 127-155, January.
    8. Forsythe, Robert & Kennan, John & Sopher, Barry, 1991. "An Experimental Analysis of Strikes in Bargaining Games with One-Sided Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 253-278, March.
    9. Paul Seabright, 2006. "The evolution of fairness norms: an essay on Ken Binmore's Natural Justice," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 5(1), pages 33-50, February.
    10. Cortés Aguilar Alexandra & Antonio M. Espín & Filippos Exadaktylos & Oyediran Olusegun A. & Palacio García, Luis Alejandro & Antonios Proestakis, 2012. "The separate effects of self-estimated and actual alcohol intoxication on risk-taking: A field experiment," ThE Papers 10/24, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
    11. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
    12. Elliot T Berkman & Evgeniya Lukinova & Ivan Menshikov & Mikhail Myagkov, 2015. "Sociality as a Natural Mechanism of Public Goods Provision," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(3), pages 1-18, March.
    13. Charness, Gary, 2000. "Self-Serving Cheap Talk: A Test Of Aumann's Conjecture," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 177-194, November.
    14. Russell Cooper & Douglas V. DeJong & Robert Forsythe & Thomas W. Ross, 1992. "Communication in Coordination Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 107(2), pages 739-771.
    15. Daniel Burghart & Paul Glimcher & Stephanie Lazzaro, 2013. "An expected utility maximizer walks into a bar..," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 215-246, June.
    16. Klajdi Bregu & Cary Deck & Lindsay Ham & Salar Jahedi, 2017. "The Effects of Alcohol Use on Economic Decision Making," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 83(4), pages 886-902, April.
    17. Luca Corazzini & Antonio Filippin & Paolo Vanin, 2015. "Economic Behavior under the Influence of Alcohol: An Experiment on Time Preferences, Risk-Taking, and Altruism," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(4), pages 1-25, April.
    18. Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
    19. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rosenthal, Howard, 1991. "Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 183-220, May.
    20. Wilson, Jeanne M. & Straus, Susan G. & McEvily, Bill, 2006. "All in due time: The development of trust in computer-mediated and face-to-face teams," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 16-33, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. En torno a una mesa: Facilitadores sociales en las negociaciones
      by Anxo Sánchez in Nada Es Gratis on 2019-06-10 05:07:51

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jie Dong & Qiran Zhao & Yanjun Ren, 2022. "Dark Side or Bright Side: The Impact of Alcohol Drinking on the Trust of Chinese Rural Residents," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(10), pages 1-15, May.
    2. Au, Pak Hung & Lim, Wooyoung & Zhang, Jipeng, 2022. "In vino veritas? Communication under the influence—An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 197(C), pages 325-340.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Brañas-Garza, Pablo & Cabrales, Antonio & Mateu, Guillermo & Sánchez, Angel & Sutan, Angela, 2023. "Social interaction and negotiation outcomes: An experimental approach," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    2. Feltovich, Nick & Grossman, Philip J., 2015. "How does the effect of pre-play suggestions vary with group size? Experimental evidence from a threshold public-good game," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 263-280.
    3. Maoliang Ye & Jie Zheng & Plamen Nikolov & Sam Asher, 2020. "One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(1), pages 113-129, January.
    4. Ro’i Zultan, 2013. "Timing of messages and the Aumann conjecture: a multiple-selves approach," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 789-800, November.
    5. Petra Nieken & Sven Walther, 2024. "Honesty in Virtual Communication," CESifo Working Paper Series 11094, CESifo.
    6. Battaglini, Marco & Makarov, Uliana, 2014. "Cheap talk with multiple audiences: An experimental analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 147-164.
    7. Zakaria Babutsidze & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2021. "Nonverbal content and trust: An experiment on digital communication," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(4), pages 1517-1532, October.
    8. Dickinson, David L. & Masclet, David & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2015. "Norm enforcement in social dilemmas: An experiment with police commissioners," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 74-85.
    9. Luis Alejandro Palacio Garcia & Brayan Snehider Díaz, 2022. "Comunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimental," Apuntes del Cenes, Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia, vol. 41(73), pages 17-42, February.
    10. Nathalie Colombier & David Masclet & Daniel Mirza & Claude Montmarquette, 2011. "Global Security Policies against Terrorism and the Free Riding Problem: An Experimental Approach," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(5), pages 755-790, October.
    11. Rigdon, Mary, 2009. "Trust and reciprocity in incentive contracting," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 93-105, May.
    12. Fortuna Casoria & Arno Riedl & Peter Werner, 2020. "Behavioral Aspects of Communication in Organizations," Post-Print halshs-03024050, HAL.
    13. Kocher, Martin G. & Martinsson, Peter & Matzat, Dominik & Wollbrant, Conny, 2015. "The role of beliefs, trust, and risk in contributions to a public good," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 236-244.
    14. Burton, Anthony & Sefton, Martin, 2004. "Risk, pre-play communication and equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 23-40, January.
    15. Bruno Biais & Christophe Bisière & Sébastien Pouget, 2014. "Equilibrium Discovery and Preopening Mechanisms in an Experimental Market," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(3), pages 753-769, March.
    16. Daniel Houser & Jianxin Wang, 2021. "Business Drinking: Evidence from A Lab-in-the-Field Experiment," Working Papers 1074, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
    17. Zakaria Babutsidze & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2020. "Nonverbal content and swift trust: An experiment on digital communication," Working Papers 2008, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    18. Müller, Julia & Schwieren, Christiane & Spitzer, Florian, 2022. "How to prevent destruction – On the malleability of anti-social behavior," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    19. Casella, Alessandra, 2011. "Agenda control as a cheap talk game: Theory and experiments with Storable Votes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 46-76, May.
    20. Müller, Julia & Schwieren, Christiane & Spitzer, Florian, 2016. "What Drives Destruction? On the Malleability of Anti-Social Behavior," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 238, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Negotiation; Trust; Business meals; Social interactions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • M11 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Production Management
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13417. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.