Tractability in Incentive Contracting
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- Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2011. "Tractability in Incentive Contracting," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(9), pages 2865-2894.
- Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2009. "Tractability in Incentive Contracting," NBER Working Papers 15545, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Edmans, Alex & Gabaix, Xavier, 2010. "Tractability in Incentive Contracting," Working Papers 10-13, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
- Xavier Gabaix & Alex Edmans, 2010. "Tractability in Incentive Contracting," 2010 Meeting Papers 1120, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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More about this item
Keywords
Closed forms; Contract theory; Dispersive order; Executive compensation; Incentives; Principal-agent problem; Subderivative;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2009-12-05 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2009-12-05 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-UPT-2009-12-05 (Utility Models and Prospect Theory)
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