Elements of the Theory of Auctions and Contests

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1. Antoine Gentier & Giuseppina Gianfreda & Nathalie Janson, 2006. "The Question of the Rent Dissipation in the Notes Issuance Activity: The Case of the Italian Banking System before the Creation of the Bank of Italy," CAE Working Papers 45, Aix-Marseille Université, CERGAM.
2. Arye Hillman & Dov Samet, 1987. "Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 63-82, January.
3. Glazer, Amihai & Konrad, Kai A., 1999. "Taxation of rent-seeking activities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 61-72, April.
   • Glazer, A. & Konrad, K.A., 1997. "Taxation of Rent-Seeking Activities," Papers 97-98-04, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
4. Emmanuel Dechenaux & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2015. "A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(4), pages 609-669, December.
   • Emmanuel Dechenaux & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2012. "A Survey of Experimental Research on Contests, All-Pay Auctions and Tournaments," Working Papers 12-22, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
   • Dechenaux, Emmanuel & Kovenock, Dan & Sheremeta, Roman, 2014. "A Survey of Experimental Research on Contests, All-Pay Auctions and Tournaments," MPRA Paper 59714, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   • Dechenaux, Emmanuel & Kovenock, Dan & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2012. "A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2012-109, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
5. Roman M. Sheremeta, 2016. "The pros and cons of workplace tournaments," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 302-302, October.
   • Sheremeta, Roman, 2016. "The Pros and Cons of Workplace Tournaments," MPRA Paper 74859, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   • Roman M. Sheremeta, 2016. "The Pros and Cons of Workplace Tournaments," Working Papers 16-27, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
   • Roman M. Sheremeta & Timothy W. Shields, 2017. "The Pros and Cons of Workplace Tournaments," Working Papers 17-04, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
6. Sheremeta, Roman, 2018. "Experimental Research on Contests," MPRA Paper 89327, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   • Roman Sheremeta, 2018. "Experimental Research on Contests," Working Papers 18-07, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
7. Roman M. Sheremeta, 2013. "Overbidding And Heterogeneous Behavior In Contest Experiments," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 491-514, July.
   • Roman M. Sheremeta, 2013. "Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments," Working Papers 13-06, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
   • Sheremeta, Roman, 2013. "Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments," MPRA Paper 44124, University Library of Munich, Germany.
8. Körber, Achim & Kolmar, Martin, 1996. "To fight or not to fight? An analysis of submission, struggle, and the design of contests," Discussion Papers, Series II 301, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
9. Van Long, Ngo, 2013. "The theory of contests: A unified model and review of the literature," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 161-181.
10. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2009. "Is the 50-State Strategy Optimal?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 21(2), pages 213-236, April.
    • Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2008. "Is the 50-State Strategy Optimal?," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1211, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
    • Kovenock, Dan & Roberson, Brian, 2008. "Is the 50-state strategy optimal? [Ist die 50-Staaten-Strategie optimal?]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2008-16, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
11. Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1979. "Auctions and Bidding Models: A Survey," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 496R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

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