Non-Excludable Public Good Experiments
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- Cason, Timothy N. & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Yamato, Takehiko & Yokotani, Konomu, 2004. "Non-excludable public good experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 81-102, October.
- Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Yamato, Takehiko & Yokotani, Konomu & Cason, Timothy N., 2002. "Non-Excludable Public Good Experiments," Working Papers 1154, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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