(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)"> (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)">
[go: up one dir, main page]

IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cla/levarc/661465000000000258.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Torture

Author

Listed:
  • Sandeep Baliga
  • Jeffrey C. Ely
Abstract
We study the optimal dynamic torture scheme offered to an informed victim by a principal who cannot commit. We interpret the principal as the representative member of society (political leader, median voter etc.). We show that an arbitrarily long torture scheme is extremely costly to the principal, however great is the information held by the victim. Increasing the intensity of torture makes the principal worse off if the torture scheme is long enough.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Sandeep Baliga & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2010. "Torture," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000258, David K. Levine.
  • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000258
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4661465000000000258.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mialon, Hugo M. & Mialon, Sue H. & Stinchcombe, Maxwell B., 2012. "Torture in counterterrorism: Agency incentives and slippery slopes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 33-41.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000258. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: David K. Levine (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.dklevine.com/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.