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The New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Election Contests

Author

Listed:
  • Zeynep B. Irfanoglu

    (Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University)

  • Shakun D. Mago

    (Department of Economics, Robins School of Business, University of Richmond)

  • Roman M. Sheremeta

    (Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University and the Economic Science Institute, Chapman University)

Abstract
This experimental study compares sequential and simultaneous election contests. Consistent with the theory, we find evidence of the “New Hampshire effect” in the sequential contests, i.e., the winner of the first electoral battle wins the overall contest with much higher probability than the loser of the first battle. However, contrary to the theory, sequential contests generate higher expenditure than the simultaneous contests. This is mainly because in the sequential contests losers of the first battle do not decrease their expenditure in the second battle while winners of the first battle increase (instead of decreasing) their expenditure in the second battle. We discuss the implications of our findings both for policy makers and social scientists.

Suggested Citation

  • Zeynep B. Irfanoglu & Shakun D. Mago & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2014. "The New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Election Contests," Working Papers 14-15, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:chu:wpaper:14-15
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    Cited by:

    1. Dong, Lu & Huang, Lingbo, 2019. "Is there no ‘I’ in team? Strategic effects in multi-battle team competition," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 75(PB).
    2. Roman M. Sheremeta, 2016. "The pros and cons of workplace tournaments," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 302-302, October.
    3. Gelder, Alan & Kovenock, Dan, 2017. "Dynamic behavior and player types in majoritarian multi-battle contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 444-455.
    4. Dripto Bakshi & Indraneel Dasgupta, 2018. "A model of dynamic conflict in ethnocracies," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(2), pages 147-170, February.
    5. Deck, Cary & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2019. "The tug-of-war in the laboratory," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    6. Shakun D. Mago & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2017. "Multi‐battle Contests: An Experimental Study," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 84(2), pages 407-425, October.
    7. Kimbrough, Erik O. & Laughren, Kevin & Sheremeta, Roman, 2020. "War and conflict in economics: Theories, applications, and recent trends," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 998-1013.
    8. Morton, Rebecca B. & Ou, Kai, 2015. "What motivates bandwagon voting behavior: Altruism or a desire to win?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 224-241.
    9. Lian Jian & Zheng Li & Tracy Xiao Liu, 2017. "Simultaneous versus sequential all-pay auctions: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(3), pages 648-669, September.
    10. SunAh An & Michael Anderson & Cary Deck, 2023. "Gerrymandering in the laboratory," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 90(1), pages 182-213, July.
    11. Doğan, Serhat & Karagözoğlu, Emin & Keskin, Kerim & Sağlam, Çağrı, 2018. "Multi-player race," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 123-136.
    12. Fu, Qiang & Ke, Changxia & Tan, Fangfang, 2015. "“Success breeds success” or “Pride goes before a fall”?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 57-79.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    election; sequential contests; simultaneous contests; experiments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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