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On the Profitability of Trade Deflection and the Need for Rules of Origin

Author

Listed:
  • Gabriel Felbermayr
  • Feodora Teti
  • Erdal Yalcin
  • Gabriel J. Felbermayr
Abstract
When two countries conclude a free trade agreement (FTA), they define rules of origin (RoOs) to determine whether a product is eligible for preferential treatment. RoOs exist to avoid that exports from third countries enter the FTA through the member with the lowest tariff (trade deflection). However, RoOs distort exporters’ sourcing decisions and burden them with red tape. Using a global data set, we show that, for 86% of global trade and 78% of bilateral product-level comparisons, trade deflection is not profitable because external tariffs are rather similar and transportation costs are non-negligible; in the presence of a deep FTA, deflection is significantly less profitable still. We find evidence for both ex post adjustment of external tariffs and ex ante selection effects. The pervasive and unconditional use of RoOs is, therefore, hard to rationalize.

Suggested Citation

  • Gabriel Felbermayr & Feodora Teti & Erdal Yalcin & Gabriel J. Felbermayr, 2018. "On the Profitability of Trade Deflection and the Need for Rules of Origin," CESifo Working Paper Series 6929, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6929
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Felbermayr Gabriel & Steininger Marina, 2019. "Revisiting the Euro’s Trade Cost and Welfare Effects," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 239(5-6), pages 917-956, October.
    2. Lake, James & Nken, Moïse & Yildiz, Halis Murat, 2020. "Tariff bindings and the dynamic formation of Preferential Trade Agreements," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    3. Luisa Kinzius & Alexander Sandkamp & Erdal Yalcin, 2019. "Trade protection and the role of non-tariff barriers," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 155(4), pages 603-643, November.
    4. Felbermayr, Gabriel & Kimura, Fukunari & Okubo, Toshihiro & Steininger, Marina, 2019. "Quantifying the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 110-128.
    5. Lukaszuk, Piotr & Legge, Stefan, 2019. "Which Factors Determine the Utilization of Preferential Tariff Rates?," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203639, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    6. Gabriel J. Felbermayr & Clemens Fuest & Hans Gersbach & Albrecht O. Ritschl & Marcel Thum & Martin T. Braml, 2019. "Hard Brexit ahead: breaking the deadlock," EconPol Policy Brief 12, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    7. Soonchan Park & Innwon Park, 2023. "Firm size‐specific trade effects of regional trade agreements: Estimating extensive and intensive margins of trade," Asian Economic Journal, East Asian Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 82-112, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    trade deflection; rules of origin; external tariffs; free trade agreements;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration

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