The Optimal Duration of Contracts
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Cited by:
- Spear, Stephen E. & Wang, Cheng, 2005.
"When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 239-256, February.
- Stephen Spear & Cheng Wang, "undated". "When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts," GSIA Working Papers 2002-E5, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Spear, Stephen E. & Wang, Cheng, 2005. "When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts," Staff General Research Papers Archive 11443, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Jan K. Brueckner & Stuart S. Rosenthal, 2022. "Tenant Riskiness, Contract Length, and the Term Structure of Commercial Leases," CESifo Working Paper Series 10189, CESifo.
- Katolnik, Svetlana & Hakenes, Hendrik, 2014. "On the Incentive Effect of Job Rotation," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100574, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
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More about this item
Keywords
contract length; term length; screening;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-HRM-2018-03-12 (Human Capital and Human Resource Management)
- NEP-MIC-2018-03-12 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2018-03-12 (Regulation)
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