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Electoral Control when Policies are for Sale

Author

Listed:
  • Etienne Farvaque
  • Gael Lagadec
Abstract
This article analyses the dynamics of electoral promises, building on an electoral competition model with endogenous policies. It extends the Grossman-Helpman (1994) model [Grossman G., Helpman E. [1994], "Protection for sale", American Economic Review, 84, 4, 833-850] to include sanctions from the electorate and lobbies when the incumbent does not satisfy the expected performance she promised to deliver. This framework allows to deal with the intertemporal dimension needed to understand the prevalent cycle of promises, disappointment, new promises, new disappointment ….

Suggested Citation

  • Etienne Farvaque & Gael Lagadec, 2009. "Electoral Control when Policies are for Sale," CESifo Working Paper Series 2522, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2522
    as

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    File URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp2522.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Chiara Landi & Gianluca Stefani, 2015. "Rent Seeking and Political Economy of Geographical Indication Foods," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(4), pages 543-563, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    lobbies; promises; elections; electoral competition; lies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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