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Why are some taxes "more equal than others"?

Author

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  • RUBINCHICK-PESSACH, Anna
Abstract
This paper examines efficiency rationales behind uniformity of taxation for public projects. Let a benevolent risk neutral 'constitutional designer' to set an optimal cost-sharing rule for a legislature operating under majority rule. Then the designer will choose 'more equal taxes' for a country with more homogeneous tastes, which is in accord with a popular view. Higher quality projects provide an additional reason for this choice. Moreover, an exogenous requirement to use broader supermajority may also lead to more uniformity.

Suggested Citation

  • RUBINCHICK-PESSACH, Anna, 2002. "Why are some taxes "more equal than others"?," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2002043, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2002043
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    File URL: https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp2002.html
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    public goods; cost sharing; constitutional design;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
    • K34 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Tax Law
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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