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Distributive politics: does electoral competition promote inequality ?

Author

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  • LASLIER, Jean-François
  • PICARD, Nathalie
Abstract
Within the framework of pure redistribution (dividing one unit of a homogeneous good among identical individuals), the paper analyses the redistributions that arise from Downsian two-party electoral competition. It appears that the strategic behavior of vote-maximizing parties lead them to propose divisions which are not far from the egalitarian one.

Suggested Citation

  • LASLIER, Jean-François & PICARD, Nathalie, 2000. "Distributive politics: does electoral competition promote inequality ?," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2000022, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2000022
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    File URL: https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp2000.html
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Szentes, Balazs & Rosenthal, Robert W., 2003. "Three-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions: chopsticks and tetrahedra," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 114-133, July.
    3. Szentes, Balazs & Rosenthal, Robert W., 2003. "Beyond chopsticks: Symmetric equilibria in majority auction games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 278-295, November.

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