[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000094/012695.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Macro-Prudential Policy under Moral Hazard and Financial Fragility

Author

Listed:
  • Carlos A. Arango
  • Oscar M. Valencia
Abstract
This paper presents a DSGE model with banks that face moral hazard in management. Banks receive demand deposits and fund investment projects. Banks are subject to potential withdrawals by depositors which may force them into early liquidation of their investments. The likelihood of this happening depends on the bank management efforts to keep the bank financially sound and the degree of bank leverage. We study the properties of this model under different monetary and macro-prudential policy arrangements. Our model is able to replicate the pro-cyclicality of leverage, and provides insights on the interplay between bank leverage and bank management incentives as a result of monetary, productivity and financial shocks. We find that a combination of pro-cyclical capital requirements and a standard monetary policy are well suited to contain the effects on output and prices of a downturn, keeping the financial system in check. Yet, in an expansionary phase (i.e. a productivity shock) this policy combination may produce desirable results for some macro-variables but at the expense of a deterioration in other macro-financial indicators.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlos A. Arango & Oscar M. Valencia, 2015. "Macro-Prudential Policy under Moral Hazard and Financial Fragility," Borradores de Economia 12695, Banco de la Republica.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000094:012695
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.banrep.gov.co/sites/default/files/publicaciones/archivos/be_878.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Adriano A Rampini & S Viswanathan, 2019. "Financial Intermediary Capital," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 86(1), pages 413-455.
    2. Bernanke, Ben S. & Gertler, Mark & Gilchrist, Simon, 1999. "The financial accelerator in a quantitative business cycle framework," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 21, pages 1341-1393, Elsevier.
    3. Adrian, Tobias & Shin, Hyun Song, 2010. "Liquidity and leverage," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 418-437, July.
    4. Denis Gromb & Dimitri Vayanos, 2010. "A Model of Financial Market Liquidity Based on Intermediary Capital," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(2-3), pages 456-466, 04-05.
    5. Chen, Nan-Kuang, 2001. "Bank net worth, asset prices and economic activity," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 415-436, October.
    6. Kalemli-Ozcan, Sebnem & Sorensen, Bent & Yesiltas, Sevcan, 2012. "Leverage across firms, banks, and countries," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 284-298.
    7. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Lasse Heje Pedersen, 2009. "Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(6), pages 2201-2238, June.
    8. Patrick Bolton & Hamid Mehran & Joel Shapiro, 2015. "Executive Compensation and Risk Taking," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 19(6), pages 2139-2181.
    9. Damar, H. Evren & Meh, Césaire A. & Terajima, Yaz, 2013. "Leverage, balance-sheet size and wholesale funding," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 639-662.
    10. Acharya, Viral & Naqvi, Hassan, 2012. "The seeds of a crisis: A theory of bank liquidity and risk taking over the business cycle," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 349-366.
    11. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Moore, John, 1997. "Credit Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 211-248, April.
    12. Chaigneau, Pierre, 2013. "Risk-shifting and the regulation of bank CEOs’ compensation," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 778-789.
    13. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2000. "A Theory of Bank Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(6), pages 2431-2465, December.
    14. Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1997. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(3), pages 663-691.
    15. Franz Alonso Hamann Salcedo & Rafael Hernández & Luisa Fernanda Silva EScobar & Fernando Tenjo Galarza, 2013. "Credit Pro-cyclicality and Bank Balance Sheet in Colombia," Borradores de Economia 762, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    16. Mark Gertler & Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, 2015. "Banking, Liquidity, and Bank Runs in an Infinite Horizon Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(7), pages 2011-2043, July.
    17. Angeloni, Ignazio & Faia, Ester & Lo Duca, Marco, 2015. "Monetary policy and risk taking," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 285-307.
    18. Angeloni, Ignazio & Faia, Ester, 2013. "Capital regulation and monetary policy with fragile banks," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 311-324.
    19. Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, 2014. "Procyclical Leverage and Value-at-Risk," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(2), pages 373-403.
    20. Giovanni Dell’Ariccia & Deniz Igan & Luc Laeven, 2012. "Credit Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Market," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(2‐3), pages 367-384, March.
    21. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Thomas M. Eisenbach & Yuliy Sannikov, 2012. "Macroeconomics with Financial Frictions: A Survey," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000384, David K. Levine.
    22. Kevin Moran & Cesaire A. Meh & Ian Christensen, 2010. "Bank Leverage Regulation and Macroeconomic Dynamics," 2010 Meeting Papers 757, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    23. Eufinger, Christian & Gill, Andrej, 2013. "Basel III and CEO compensation in banks: Pay structures as a regulatory signal," SAFE Working Paper Series 9, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    24. John, Teresa A & John, Kose, 1993. "Top-Management Compensation and Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(3), pages 949-974, July.
    25. Meh, Césaire A. & Moran, Kevin, 2010. "The role of bank capital in the propagation of shocks," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 555-576, March.
    26. John Geanakoplos, 2010. "The Leverage Cycle," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2009, Volume 24, pages 1-65, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    27. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2001. "Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 287-327, April.
    28. Andrea Gerali & Stefano Neri & Luca Sessa & Federico M. Signoretti, 2010. "Credit and Banking in a DSGE Model of the Euro Area," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(s1), pages 107-141, September.
    29. Gertler, Mark & Karadi, Peter, 2011. "A model of unconventional monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 17-34, January.
    30. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, 2009. "A Multiplicative Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(12), pages 4881-4917, December.
    31. John Geanakoplos, 2009. "The Leverage Cycle," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1715R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2010.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Fabiana Gómez & Jorge Ponce, 2019. "Regulation and Bankers’ Incentives," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 56(3), pages 209-227, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Carlos Arango & Oscar Valencia, 2015. "Macro-prudential Policies, Moral Hazard and Financial Fragility," IHEID Working Papers 06-2015, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    2. Stijn Claessens & M Ayhan Kose, 2018. "Frontiers of macrofinancial linkages," BIS Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 95.
    3. Coimbra, Nuno, 2020. "Sovereigns at risk: A dynamic model of sovereign debt and banking leverage," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    4. Hristov, Nikolay & Hülsewig, Oliver, 2017. "Unexpected loan losses and bank capital in an estimated DSGE model of the euro area," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 54(PB), pages 161-186.
    5. Andrea Ajello & Nina Boyarchenko & François Gourio & Andrea Tambalotti, 2022. "Financial Stability Considerations for Monetary Policy: Theoretical Mechanisms," Staff Reports 1002, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    6. Brunnermeier, Markus K. & Oehmke, Martin, 2013. "Bubbles, Financial Crises, and Systemic Risk," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1221-1288, Elsevier.
    7. Suh, Hyunduk & Walker, Todd B., 2016. "Taking financial frictions to the data," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 39-65.
    8. Gebauer, Stefan & Mazelis, Falk, 2018. "The Role of Shadow Banking for Financial Regulation," VfS Annual Conference 2018 (Freiburg, Breisgau): Digital Economy 181581, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    9. Gerke, R. & Jonsson, M. & Kliem, M. & Kolasa, M. & Lafourcade, P. & Locarno, A. & Makarski, K. & McAdam, P., 2013. "Assessing macro-financial linkages: A model comparison exercise," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 253-264.
    10. Uwe Vollmer, 2022. "Monetary policy or macroprudential policies: What can tame the cycles?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(5), pages 1510-1538, December.
    11. Hollander, Hylton, 2017. "Macroprudential policy with convertible debt," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 54(PB), pages 285-305.
    12. Matthieu Darracq Paries, 2018. "Financial frictions and monetary policy conduct," Erudite Ph.D Dissertations, Erudite, number ph18-01 edited by Ferhat Mihoubi.
    13. Lubello, Federico & Petrella, Ivan & Santoro, Emiliano, 2019. "Bank assets, liquidity and credit cycles," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 265-282.
    14. Kühl, Michael, 2017. "Bank capital, the state contingency of banks’ assets and its role for the transmission of shocks," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 54(PB), pages 260-284.
    15. Galo Nuño & Carlos Thomas, 2017. "Bank Leverage Cycles," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 32-72, April.
    16. Hans Gersbach & Jean-Charles Rochet & Martin Scheffel, 2023. "Financial Intermediation, Capital Accumulation, and Crisis Recovery," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 27(4), pages 1423-1469.
    17. Silvo, Aino, 2016. "The interaction of monetary and macroprudential policies in economic stabilisation," Research Discussion Papers 1/2016, Bank of Finland.
    18. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/293qice3lj861rvos9ns14n0h0 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Sami Alpanda & Gino Cateau & Césaire Meh, 2018. "A policy model to analyze macroprudential regulations and monetary policy," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 51(3), pages 828-863, August.
    20. repec:zbw:bofrdp:urn:nbn:fi:bof-201602101026 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Ioanna Kokores, 2015. "Lean-Against-the-Wind Monetary Policy: The Post-Crisis Shift in the Literature," SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, University of Piraeus, vol. 65(3-4), pages 66-99, july-Dece.
    22. Mimir, Yasin, 2012. "Financial intermediaries, credit Shocks and business cycles," MPRA Paper 39648, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    DSGE modeling; Financial frictions; Moral hazard; Macro-prudential policies.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:col:000094:012695. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Clorith Angelica Bahos Olivera (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.