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Minimal Maskin Monotonic Extensions of Tournament Solutions

In: Individual and Collective Choice and Social Welfare

Author

Listed:
  • İpek Özkal-Sanver

    (İstanbul Bilgi University)

  • Pelin Pasin

    (İzmir Katip Çelebi University)

  • M. Remzi Sanver

    (İstanbul Bilgi University)

Abstract
In this paper we give a general characterization of the minimal Maskin monotonic extensions of Condorcet consistent tournament solutions. We then compute the minimal Maskin monotonic extensions for the following rules: The top-cycle, the uncovered set, the iterated uncovered set, the minimal covering set and the Copeland rule. Moreover, we characterize the minimal Maskin monotonic extensions of the social choice rules that are generated by the top-cycle, the uncovered set, the iterated uncovered set, and the minimal covering set via the majority rule. We also give results establishing the relation between the minimal Maskin monotonic extensions in the tournament environment and the social choice environment.

Suggested Citation

  • İpek Özkal-Sanver & Pelin Pasin & M. Remzi Sanver, 2015. "Minimal Maskin Monotonic Extensions of Tournament Solutions," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Constanze Binder & Giulio Codognato & Miriam Teschl & Yongsheng Xu (ed.), Individual and Collective Choice and Social Welfare, edition 127, pages 127-141, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-662-46439-7_8
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-46439-7_8
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    Cited by:

    1. M. Remzi Sanver, 2017. "Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(1), pages 65-72, March.

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